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Abstract. Websites today routinely combine JavaScript from multi-
ple sources, both trusted and untrusted. Hence, JavaScript security is
of paramount importance. A specific interesting problem is information
flow control (IFC) for JavaScript. In this paper, we develop, formalize
and implement a dynamic IFC mechanism for the JavaScript engine of a
production Web browser (specifically, Safari’s WebKit engine). Our IFC
mechanism works at the level of JavaScript bytecode and hence lever-
ages years of industrial effort on optimizing both the source to bytecode
compiler and the bytecode interpreter. We track both explicit and im-
plicit flows and observe only moderate overhead. Working with bytecode
results in new challenges including the extensive use of unstructured
control flow in bytecode (which complicates lowering of program context
taints), unstructured exceptions (which complicate the matter further)
and the need to make IFC analysis permissive. We explain how we ad-
dress these challenges, formally model the JavaScript bytecode semantics
and our instrumentation, prove the standard property of termination-
insensitive non-interference, and present experimental results on an op-
timized prototype.
Keywords: Dynamic information flow control, JavaScript bytecode, taint
tracking, control flow graphs, immediate post-dominator analysis
1 Introduction
JavaScript (JS) is an indispensable part of the modern Web. More than 95% of
all websites use JS for browser-side computation in Web applications [1]. Ag-
gregator websites (e.g., news portals) integrate content from various mutually
untrusted sources. Online mailboxes display context-sensitive advertisements.
All these components are glued together with JS. The dynamic nature of JS
permits easy inclusion of external libraries and third-party code, and encourages
a variety of code injection attacks, which may lead to integrity violations. Con-
fidentiality violations like information stealing are possible wherever third-party
code is loaded directly into another web page [2]. Loading third-party code into
separate iframes protects the main frame by the same-origin policy, but hinders
interaction that mashup pages crucially rely on and does not guarantee absence
of attacks [3]. Information flow control (IFC) is an elegant solution for such
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problems. It ensures security even in the presence of untrusted and buggy code.
IFC for JS differs from traditional IFC as JS is extremely dynamic [3,1], which
makes sound static analysis difficult.
Therefore, research on IFC for JS has focused on dynamic techniques. These
techniques may be grouped into four broad categories. First, one may build
an IFC-enabled, custom interpreter for JS source [4,5]. This turns out to be ex-
tremely slow and requires additional code annotations to handle semi-structured
control flow like exceptions, return-in-the-middle, break and continue. Second,
we could use a black-box technique, wherein an off-the-shelf JS interpreter is
wrapped in a monitor. This is nontrivial, but doable with only moderate over-
head and has been implemented in secure multi-execution (SME)[6,7]. However,
because SME is a black-box technique, it is not clear how it can be generalized
beyond non-interference [8] to handle declassification [9,10]. Third, some variant
of inline reference monitoring (IRM) might inline taint tracking with the client
code. Existing security systems for JS with IRM require subsetting the language
in order to prevent dynamic features that can invalidate the monitoring process.
Finally, it is possible to instrument the runtime system of an existing JS engine,
either an interpreter or a just-in-time compiler (JIT), to monitor the program
on-the-fly. While this requires adapting the respective runtime, it incurs only
moderate overhead because it retains other optimizations within the runtime
and is resilient to subversion attacks.
In this work, we opt for the last approach. We instrument a production
JS engine to track taints dynamically and enforce termination-insensitive non-
interference [11]. Specifically, we instrument the bytecode interpreter in WebKit,
the JS engine used in Safari and other open-source browsers. The major benefit
of working in the bytecode interpreter as opposed to source is that we retain
the benefits of these years of engineering efforts in optimizing the production
interpreter and the source to bytecode compiler.
We describe the key challenges that arise in dynamic IFC for JS bytecode (as
opposed to JS source), present our formal model of the bytecode, the WebKit JS
interpreter and our instrumentation, present our correctness theorem, and list
experimental results from a preliminary evaluation with an optimized prototype
running in Safari. In doing so, our work significantly advances the state-of-the-art
in IFC for JS. Our main contributions are:
– We formally model WebKit’s bytecode syntax and semantics, our instrumen-
tation for IFC analysis and prove non-interference. As far as we are aware,
this is the first formal model of bytecode of an in-production JS engine. This
is a nontrivial task because WebKit’s bytecode language is large (147 byte-
codes) and we built the model through a careful and thorough understanding
of approximately 20,000 lines of actual interpreter code.3
3 Unlike some prior work, we are not interested in modeling semantics of JS specified
by the ECMAScript standard. Our goal is to remain faithful to the production
bytecode interpreter. Our formalization is based on WebKit build #r122160, which
was the last build when we started our work.
– Using ideas from prior work [12], we use on-the-fly intra-procedural static
analysis of immediate post-dominators to restrict overtainting, even with
bytecode’s pervasive unstructured conditional jumps. We extend the prior
work to deal with exceptions. Our technique covers all unstructured control
flow in JS (including break and continue), without requiring additional code
annotations of prior work [5] and improves permissiveness.
– To make IFC execution more permissive, we propose and implement a byte-
code-specific variant of the permissive-upgrade check [13].
– We implement our complete IFC mechanism in WebKit and observe moder-
ate overheads.
Limitations We list some limitations of our work to clarify its scope. Although
our instrumentation covers all WebKit bytecodes, we have not yet instrumented
or modeled native JS methods, including those that manipulate the Document
Object Model (DOM). This is ongoing work, beyond the scope of this paper.
Like some prior work [4], our sequential non-interference theorem covers only
single invocations of the JS interpreter. In reality, JS is reactive. The interpreter
is invoked every time an event (like a mouse click) with a handler occurs and
these invocations share state through the DOM. We expect that generalizing to
reactive non-interference [14] will not require any instrumentation beyond what
we already plan to do for the DOM. Finally, we do not handle JIT-compilation
as it is considerably more engineering effort. JIT can be handled by inlining our
IFC mechanism through a bytecode transformation.
Due to lack of space, several proofs and details of the model have been omitted
from this paper. They can be found in the technical appendix (Section 8).
2 Related Work
Three classes of research are closely related to our work: formalization of JS se-
mantics, IFC for dynamic languages, and formal models of Web browsers. Maffeis
et al. [15] present a formal semantics for the entire ECMA-262 specification, the
foundation for JS 3.0. Guha et al. [16] present the semantics of a core language
which models the essence of JS and argue that all of JS 3.0 can be translated to
that core. S5 [17] extends [16] to include accessors and eval. Our work goes one
step further and formalizes the core language of a production JS engine (Web-
Kit), which is generated by the source-to-bytecode compiler included in WebKit.
Recent work by Bodin et al. [18] presents a Coq formalization of ECMAScript
Edition 5 along with an extracted executable interpreter for it. This is a formal-
ization of the English ECMAScript specification whereas we formalize the JS
bytecode implemented in a real Web browser.
Information flow control is an active area of security research. With the
widespread use of JS, research in dynamic techniques for IFC has regained mo-
mentum. Nonetheless, static analyses are not completely futile. Guarnieri et
al. [19] present a static abstract interpretation for tracking taints in JS. How-
ever, the omnipresent eval construct is not supported and this approach does
not take implicit flows into account. Chugh et al. propose a staged information
flow approach for JS [20]. They perform server-side static policy checks on stat-
ically available code and generate residual policy-checks that must be applied
to dynamically loaded code. This approach is limited to certain JS constructs
excluding dynamic features like dynamic field access or the with construct.
Austin and Flanagan [21] propose purely dynamic IFC for dynamically-typed
languages like JS. They use the no-sensitive-upgrade (NSU) check [22] to han-
dle implicit flows. Their permissive-upgrade strategy [13] is more permissive
than NSU but retains termination-insensitive non-interference. We build on the
permissive-upgrade strategy. Just et al. [12] present dynamic IFC for JS bytecode
with static analysis to determine implicit flows precisely even in the presence of
semi-unstructured control flow like break and continue. Again, NSU is lever-
aged to prevent implicit flows. Our overall ideas for dealing with unstructured
control flow are based on this work. In contrast to this paper, there was no for-
malization of the bytecodes, no proof of correctness, and implicit flow due to
exceptions was ignored.
Hedin and Sabelfeld propose a dynamic IFC approach for a language which
models the core features of JS [4], but they ignore JS’s constructs for semi-struc-
tured control flow like break and continue. Their approach leverages a dynamic
type system for JS source. To improve permissiveness, their subsequent work [23]
uses testing. It detects security violations due to branches that have not been
executed and injects annotations to prevent these in subsequent runs. A further
extension introduces annotations to deal with semi-structured control flow [5].
Our approach relies on analyzing CFGs and does not require annotations.
Secure multi-execution (SME) [6] is another approach to enforcing non-
interference at runtime. Conceptually, one executes the same code once for each
security level (like low and high) with the following constraints: high inputs are
replaced by default values for the low execution, and low outputs are permitted
only in the low execution. This modification of the semantics forces even unsafe
scripts to adhere to non-interference. FlowFox [7] demonstrates SME in the con-
text of Web browsers. Executing a script multiple times can be prohibitive for
a security lattice with multiple levels. Further, all writes to the DOM are con-
sidered publicly visible output, while tainting allows persisting a security label
on DOM elements. It is also unclear how declassification may be integrated into
SME. Austin and Flanagan [24] introduce a notion of faceted values to simulate
multiple executions in one run. They keep n values for every variable correspond-
ing to n security levels. All the values are used for computation as the program
proceeds but the mechanism enforces non-interference by restricting the leak of
high values to low observers.
Browsers work reactively; input is fed to an event queue that is processed
over time. Input to one event can produce output that influences the input to
a subsequent event. Bohannon et al. [14] present a formalization of a reactive
system and compare several definitions of reactive non-interference. Bielova et
al. [25] extend reactive non-interference to a browser model based on SME. This
is currently the only approach that supports reactive non-interference for JS. We
will extend our work to the reactive setting as the next step.
Finally, Featherweight Firefox [26] presents a formal model of a browser based
on a reactive model that resembles that of Bohannon et al. [14]. It instantiates
the consumer and producer states in the model with actual browser objects like
window, page, cookie store, mode, connection, etc. Our current work entirely
focuses on the formalization of the JS engine and taint tracking to monitor
information leaks. We believe these two approaches complement each other and
plan to integrate such a model into our future holistic enforcement mechanism
spanning JS, the DOM and other browser components.
3 Background
We provide a brief overview of basic concepts in dynamic enforcement of infor-
mation flow control (IFC). In dynamic IFC, a language runtime is instrumented
to carry a security label or taint with every value. The taint is an element of a
pre-determined lattice and is an upper bound on the security levels of all entities
that have influenced the computation that led to the value. For simplicity of ex-
position, we use throughout this paper a three-point lattice {L,H, ?} (L = low
or public, H = high or secret, ? = partially leaked secret), with L v H v ? [13].
For now, readers may ignore ?. Our instrumentation works over a more general
powerset lattice, whose individual elements are Web domains. We write r` for a
value r tagged with label `.
Information flows can be categorized as explicit and implicit [27]. Explicit
flows arise as a result of variables being assigned to others, or through primitive
operations. For instance, the statement x = y + z causes an explicit flow from
values in both z and y to x. Explicit flows are handled in the runtime by updating
the label of the computed value (x in our example) with the least upper bound
of the labels of the operands in the computation (y, z in our example).
Implicit flows arise from control dependencies. For example, in the program
l = 0; if (h) {l = 1;}, there is an implicit flow from h to the final value
of l (that value is 1 iff h is 1). To handle implicit flows, dynamic IFC systems
maintain the so-called pc label (program-context label), which is an upper bound
on the labels of values that have influenced the control flow thus far. In our last
example, if the value in h has label H, then pc will be H within the if branch.
After l = 1 is executed, the final value of l inherits not only the label of 1
(which is L), but also of the pc; hence, that label is also H. This alone does not
prevent information leaks: When h = 0, l ends with 0L; when h = 1, l ends
with 1H . Since 0L and 1H can be distinguished by a public attacker, this program
leaks the value of h despite correct propagation of implicit taints. Formally, the
instrumented semantics so far fail the standard property of non-interference [8].
This problem can be resolved through the well-known no-sensitive-upgrade
(NSU) check [22,21], which prohibits assignment to a low-labeled variable when
pc is high. This recovers non-interference if the adversary cannot observe program
termination (termination-insensitive non-interference). In our example, when h
= 0, the program terminates with l = 0L. When h = 1, the instruction l = 1
gets stuck due to NSU. These two outcomes are deemed observationally equiv-
alent for the low adversary, who cannot determine whether or not the program
has terminated in the second case. Hence, the program is deemed secure.
Roughly, a program is termination-insensitive non-interferent if any two ter-
minating runs of the program starting from low-equivalent heaps (i.e., heaps
that look equivalent to the adversary) end in low-equivalent heaps. Like all
sound dynamic IFC approaches, our instrumentation renders any JS program
termination-insensitive non-interferent, at the cost of modifying semantics of
programs that leak information.
4 Design, Challenges, Insights and Solutions
We implement dynamic IFC for JS in the widely used WebKit engine by instru-
menting WebKit’s bytecode interpreter. In WebKit, bytecode is generated by a
source-code compiler. Our goal is to not modify the compiler, but we are forced
to make slight changes to it to make it compliant with our instrumentation. The
modification is explained in Section 6. Nonetheless, almost all our work is limited
to the bytecode interpreter.
WebKit’s bytecode interpreter is a rather standard stack machine, with sev-
eral additional data structures for JS-specific features like scope chains, variable
environments, prototype chains and function objects. Local variables are held in
registers on the call stack. Our instrumentation adds a label to all data struc-
tures, including registers, object properties and scope chain pointers, adds code
to propagate explicit and implicit taints and implements a more permissive vari-
ant of the NSU check. Our label is a word size bit-set (currently 64 bits); each
bit in the bit-set represents taint from a distinct domain (like google.com). Join
on labels is simply bitwise or.
Unlike the ECMAScript specification of JS semantics, the actual implemen-
tation does not treat scope chains or variable environments like ordinary ob-
jects. Consequently, we model and instrument taint propagation on all these
data structures separately. Working at the low-level of the bytecode also leads
to several interesting conceptual and implementation issues in taint propagation
as well as interesting questions about the threat model, all of which we explain
in this section. Some of the issues are quite general and apply beyond JS. For
example, we combine our dynamic analysis with a bit of static analysis to handle
unstructured control flow and exceptions.
Threat model and compiler assumptions We explain our high-level threat model.
Following standard practice, our adversary may observe all low-labeled values
in the heap (more generally, an adversary at level ` in a lattice can observe
all heap values with labels ≤ `). However, we do not allow the adversary to
directly observe internal data structures like the call stack or scope chains. This
is consistent with actual interfaces in a browser that third-party scripts can
access. In our non-interference proofs we must also show low-equivalence of these
internal data structures across two runs to get the right induction invariants,
but assuming that they are inaccessible to the adversary allows more permissive
program execution, which we explain in Section 4.1.
The bytecode interpreter executes in a shared space with other browser com-
ponents, so we assume that those components do not leak information over side
channels, e.g., they do not copy heap data from secret to public locations. This
also applies to the compiler, but we do not assume that the compiler is func-
tionally correct. Trivial errors in the compiler, e.g., omitting a bytecode could
result in a leaky program even when the source code has no information leaks.
Because our IFC works on the compiler’s output, such compiler errors are not a
concern. Formally, we assume that the compiler is an unspecified deterministic
function of the program to compile and of the call stack, but not of the heap.
This assumption also matches how the compiler works within WebKit: It needs
access to the call stack and scope chain to optimize generated bytecode. How-
ever, the compiler never needs access to the heap. We ignore information leaks
due to other side channels like timing.
4.1 Challenges and Solutions
IFC for JS is known to be difficult due to JS’s highly dynamic nature. Working
with bytecode instead of source code makes IFC harder. Nonetheless, solutions
to many JS-specific IFC concerns proposed in earlier work [4] also apply to
our instrumentation, sometimes in slightly modified form. For example, in JS,
every object has a fixed parent, called a prototype, which is looked up when a
property does not exist in the child. This can lead to implicit flows: If an object
is created in a high context (when the pc is high) and a field missing from it,
but present in the prototype, is accessed later in a low context, then there is
an implicit leak from the high pc. This problem is avoided in both source- and
bytecode-level analysis in the same way: The “prototype” pointer from the child
to the parent is labeled with the pc where the child is created, and the label
of any value read from the parent after traversing the pointer is joined with
this label. Other potential information flow problems whose solutions remain
unchanged between source- and bytecode-level analysis include implicit leaks
through function pointers and handling of eval [12,4].
Working with bytecode both leads to some interesting insights, which are,
in some cases, even applicable to source code analysis and other languages, and
poses new challenges. We discuss some of these challenges and insights.
Unstructured control flow and CFGs To avoid overtainting pc labels, an impor-
tant goal in implicit flow tracking is to determine when the influence of a control
construct has ended. For block-structured control flow limited to if and while
commands, this is straightforward: The effect of a control construct ends with
its lexical scope, e.g., in (if (h) {l = 1;}; l = 2), h influences the control
flow at l = 1 but not at l = 2. This leads to a straightforward pc upgrading
and downgrading strategy: One maintains a stack of pc labels [22]; the effective
pc is the top one. When entering a control flow construct like if or while, a new
pc label, equal to the join of labels of all values on which the construct’s guard
depends with the previous effective pc, is pushed. When exiting the construct,
the label is popped.
Unfortunately, it is unclear how to extend this simple strategy to non-block-
structured control flow constructs such as exceptions, break, continue and
return-in-the-middle for functions, all of which occur in JS. For example, con-
sider the program l = 1; while(1) {... if (h) {break;}; l = 0; break;}
with h labeled H. This program leaks the value of h into l, but no assignment
to l appears in a block-scope guarded by h. Indeed, the pc upgrading and down-
grading strategy just described is ineffective for this program. Prior work on
source code IFC either omits some of these constructs [4,28], or introduces ad-
ditional classes of labels to address these problems — a label for exceptions [4],
a label for each loop containing break or continue and a label for each func-
tion [5]. These labels are more restrictive than needed, e.g., the code indicated
by dots in the example above is executed irrespective of the condition h in the
first iteration, and thus there is no need to raise the pc before checking that
condition. Further, these labels are programmer annotations, which we cannot
support as we do not wish to modify the compiler.
Importantly, unstructured control flow is a very serious concern for us, be-
cause WebKit’s bytecode has completely unstructured branches like jump-if-
false. In fact, all control flow, except function calls, is unstructured in bytecode.
To solve this problem, we adopt a solution based on static analysis of gener-
ated bytecode [29,12]. We maintain a control flow graph (CFG) of known byte-
codes and for each branch node, compute its immediate post-dominator (IPD).
The IPD of a node is the first instruction that will definitely be executed, no
matter which branch is taken. Our pc upgrading and downgrading strategy now
extends to arbitrary control flow: When executing a branch node, we push a
new pc label on the stack along with the node’s IPD. When we actually reach
the IPD, we pop the pc label. In [30,31], the authors prove that the IPD marks
the end of the scope of an operation and hence the security context of the op-
eration, so our strategy is sound. In our earlier example, the IPD of if(h) ...
is the end of the while loop because of the first break statement, so when h
== 0, the assignment l = 1 fails due to the NSU check and the program is
termination-insensitive non-interference secure.
JS requires dynamic code compilation. We are forced to extend the CFG and
to compute IPDs whenever code for either a function or an eval is compiled.
Fortunately, the IPD of a node in the CFG lies either in the same function as
the node or some function earlier in the call-chain (the latter may happen due to
exceptions), so extending the CFG does not affect computation of IPDs of earlier
nodes. This also relies on the fact that code generated from eval cannot alter
the CFG of earlier functions in the call stack [12]. In the actual implementation,
we optimize the calculation of IPDs further by working only intra-procedurally,
as explained below. At the end, our IPD-based solution works for all forms of
unstructured control flow, including unstructured branches in the bytecode, and
semi-structured break, continue, return-in-the-middle and exceptions in the
source code.
Exceptions and synthetic exit nodes Maintaining a CFG in the presence of ex-
ceptions is expensive. An exception-throwing node in a function that does not
catch that exception should have an outgoing control flow edge to the next ex-
ception handler in the call-stack. This means that (a) the CFG is, in general,
inter-procedural, and (b) edges going out of a function depend on its calling con-
text, so IPDs of nodes in the function must be computed every time the function
is called. Moreover, in the case of recursive functions, the nodes must be repli-
cated for every call. This is rather expensive. Ideally, we would like to build the
function’s CFG once when the function is compiled and work intra-procedurally
(as we would had there been no exceptions). We explain how we attain this goal
in the sequel.4
In our design, every function that may throw an unhandled exception has
a special, synthetic exit node (SEN), which is placed after the regular return
node(s) of the function. Every exception-throwing node, whose exception will
not be caught within the function, has an outgoing edge to the SEN, which is
traversed when the exception is thrown. The semantics of SEN (described below)
correctly transfer control to the appropriate exception handler. By doing this, we
eliminate all cross-function edges and our CFGs become intra-procedural. The
CFG of a function can be computed when the function is compiled and is never
updated. (In our implementation, we build two variants of the CFG, depending
on whether or not there is an exception handler in the call stack. This improves
efficiency, as we explain later.)
Control flows to the SEN when the function returns normally or when an
exception is thrown but not handled within the function. If no unhandled excep-
tion occurred within the function, then the SEN transfers control to the caller
(we record whether or not an unhandled exception occurred). If an unhandled
exception occurred, then the SEN triggers a special mechanism that searches
the call stack backward for the first appropriate exception handler and transfers
control to it. (In JS, exceptions are indistinguishable, so we need to find only the
first exception handler.) Importantly, we pop the call-stack up to the frame that
contains the first exception handler but do not pop the pc-stack, which ensures
that all code up to the exception handler’s IPD executes with the same pc as
the SEN, which is indeed the semantics one would expect if we had a CFG with
cross-function edges for exceptions. This prevents information leaks.
If a function does not handle a possible exception but there is an exception
handler on the call stack, then all bytecodes that could potentially throw an
exception have the SEN as one successor in the CFG. Any branching bytecode
will thus need to push to the pc-stack according to the security label of its
condition. However, we do not push a new pc-stack entry if the IPD of the
current node is the same as the IPD on the top of the pc-stack (this is just
4 This problem and our solution are not particular to JS; they apply to dynamic IFC
analysis in all languages with exceptions and functions.
an optimization) or if the IPD of the current node is the SEN, as in this case
the real IPD, which is outside of this method, is already on the pc-stack. These
semantics emulate the effect of having cross-function exception edges.
For illustration, consider the following two functions f and g. The  at the
end of g denotes its SEN. Note that there is an edge from throw 9 to  because
throw 9 is not handled within g.  denotes the IPD of the handler catch(e)
{ l = 1; }.
function f() = {
l = 0;
try { g(); } catch(e) { l = 1; }
 return l;
}
function g() = {
if (h) {throw 9;}
return 7;
} 
It should be clear that in the absence of instrumentation, when f is invoked
with pc = L, the two functions together leak the value of h (which is assumed to
have label H) into the return value of f. We show how our SEN mechanism pre-
vents this leak. When invoking g() we do not know if there will be an exception
in this function. Depending on the outcome of this method call, we will either
jump to the exception handler or continue at . Based on that branch, we push
the current pc and IPD (L,) on the pc-stack. When executing the condition
if (h) we do not push again, but merely update the top element to (H,). If h
== 0, control reaches  without an exception but with pc = H because the IPD
of if (h) is . At this point,  returns control to f, thus pc = H, but at , pc
is lowered to L, so f ends with the return value 0L. If h == 1, control reaches 
with an unhandled exception. At this point, following the semantics of SEN, we
find the exception handler catch(e) { l = 1; } and invoke it with the same
pc as the point of exception, i.e., H. Consequently, NSU prevents the assignment
l = 1, which makes the program termination-insensitive non-interferent.
Because we do not wish to replicate the CFG of a function every time it is
called recursively, we need a method to distinguish the same node corresponding
to two different recursive calls on the pc-stack. For this, when pushing an IPD
onto the pc-stack, we pair it with a pointer to the current call-frame. Since the
call-frame pointer is unique for each recursive call, the CFG node paired with
the call-frame identifies a unique merge point in the real control flow graph.
In practice, even the intra-procedural CFG is quite dense because many JS
bytecodes can potentially throw exceptions and, hence, have edges to the SEN.
To avoid overtainting, we perform a crucial common-case optimization: When
there is no exception handler on the call stack we do not create the SEN and
the corresponding edges from potentially exception-throwing bytecodes at all.
This is safe as a potentially thrown exception can only terminate the program
instantly, which satisfies termination-insensitive non-interference if we ensure
that the exception message is not visible to the attacker. Whether or not an
exception handler exists is easily tracked using a stack of Booleans that mirrors
the call-stack; in our design we overlay this stack on the pc-stack by adding an
extra Boolean field to each entry of the pc-stack. In summary, each entry of our
pc-stack is a quadruple containing a security label, a node in the intraprocedural
CFG, a call-frame pointer and a Boolean value. In combination with SENs, this
design allows us to work only with intraprocedural CFGs that are computed
when a function is compiled. This improves efficiency.
Permissive-upgrade check, with changes The standard NSU check halts program
execution whenever an attempt is made to assign a variable with a low-labeled
value in a high pc. In our earlier example, l = 0; if (h) {l = 1;}, assuming
that h stores a H-labeled value, program execution is halted at the command
l = 1. As Austin and Flanagan (AF in the sequel) observe [13], this may be
overly restrictive when l will not, in fact, have observable effects (e.g., l may
be overwritten by a constant immediately after if (h) {l = 1;}). So, they
propose propagating a special taint called ? into l at the instruction l = 1 and
halting a program when it tries to use a value labeled ? in a way that will be
observable (AF call this special taint P for “partially leaked”). This idea, called
the permissive-upgrade check, allows more program execution than NSU would,
so we adopt it. In fact, this additional permissiveness is absolutely essential for us
because the WebKit compiler often generates dead assignments within branches,
so execution would pointlessly halt if standard NSU were used.
We differ from AF in what constitutes a use of a value labeled ?. As expected,
AF treat occurrence of ? in the guard of a branch as a use. Thus, the program l
= 0; if (h) {l = 1;}; if (l) {l’ = 2} is halted at the command if (l)
when h == 1 because l obtains taint ? at the assignment l = 1 (if the program
is not halted, it leaks h through l’). However, they allow ?-tainted values to
flow into the heap. Consider the program l = 0; if (h) {l = 1;}; obj.a =
l. This program is insecure in our model: The heap location obj.a, which is
accessible to the adversary, ends with 0L when h == 0 and with 1? when h
== 1. AF deem the program secure by assuming that any value with label ? is
low-equivalent to any other value (in particular, 0L and 1? are low-equivalent).
However, this definition of low-equivalence for dynamic analysis is virtually im-
possible to enforce if the adversary has access to the heap outside the language:
After writing 0L to obj.a (for h == 0), a dynamic analysis cannot determine
that the alternate execution of the program (for h == 1) would have written a
?-labeled value and, hence, cannot prevent the adversary from seeing 0L.
Consequently, in our design, we use a modified permissive-upgrade check,
which we call the deferred NSU check, wherein a program is halted at any con-
struct that may potentially flow a ?-labeled value into the heap. This includes
all branches whose guard contains a ?-labeled value and any assignments whose
target is a heap location and whose source is ?-labeled. However, we do not
constrain flow of ?-labeled values in data structures that are invisible to the ad-
versary in our model, e.g., local registers and variable environments. This design
critically relies on treating internal data structures differently from ordinary JS
objects, which is not the case, for instance, in the ECMAScript specification.
5 Formal Model and IFC
We formally model WebKit’s JS bytecode and the semantics of its bytecode
interpreter with our instrumentation of dynamic IFC. We prove termination-
ins := prim-ins | obj-ins
| func-ins | scope-ins | exc-ins
prim-ins := prim dst:r src1:r src2:r
| mov dst:r src:r
| jfalse cond:r target:offset
| loop-if-less src1:r src2:r target:offset
| typeof dst:r src:r
| instanceof dst:r value:r cProt:r
func-ins := enter
| ret result:r
| end result:r
| call func:r args:n
| call-put-result res:r
| call-eval func:r args:n
| create-arguments dst:r
| new-func dst:r func:f
| create-activation dst:r
| construct func:r args:n
| create-this dst:r
obj-ins := new-object dst:r
| get-by-id dst:r base:r prop:id
| put-by-id base:r prop:id value:r direct:b
| del-by-id dst:r base:r prop:id
| get-pnames dst:r base:r i:n size:n breaktarget:offset
| next-pname dst:r base:r i:n size:n iter:n target:offset
| put-getter-setter base:r prop:id getter:r setter:r
scope-ins := resolve dst:r prop:id
| resolve-skip dst:r prop:id skip:n
| resolve-global dst:r prop:id
| resolve-base dst:r prop:id isStrict:bool
| resolve-with-base bDst:r pDst:r prop:id
| get-scoped-var dst:r index:n skip:n
| put-scoped-var index:n skip:n value:r
| push-scope scope:r
| pop-scope
| jmp-scope count:n target:offset
exc-ins := throw ex:r
| catch ex:r
Fig. 1. Instructions
insensitive non-interference for programs executed through our instrumented
interpreter. We do not model the construction of the CFG or computation of
IPDs; these are standard. To keep presentation accessible, we present our for-
mal model at a somewhat high-level of abstraction. Details are resolved in our
technical appendix.
5.1 Bytecode and Data Structures
The version of WebKit we model uses a total of 147 bytecodes or instructions,
of which we model 69. The remaining 78 bytecodes are redundant from the
perspective of formal modeling because they are specializations or wrappers on
other bytecodes to improve efficiency. The syntax of the 69 bytecodes we model
is shown in Fig. 1. The bytecode prim abstractly represents 34 primitive binary
and unary (with just the first two arguments) operations, all of which behave
similarly. For convenience, we divide the bytecodes into primitive instructions
(prim-ins), instructions related to objects and prototype chains (obj-ins), in-
structions related to functions (func-ins), instructions related to scope chains
(scope-ins) and instructions related to exceptions (exc-ins). A bytecode has the
form 〈inst_name list_of_args〉. The arguments to the instruction are of the
form 〈var〉:〈type〉, where var is the variable name and type is one of the following:
r, n, bool, id, prop and offset for register, constant integer, constant Boolean,
identifier, property name and jump offset value, respectively.
In WebKit, bytecode is organized into code blocks. Each code block is a
sequence of bytecodes with line numbers and corresponds to the instructions for
a function or an eval statement. A code block is generated when a function
is created or an eval is executed. In our instrumentation, we perform control
flow analysis on a code block when it is created and in our formal model we
abstractly represent a code block as a CFG, written ζ. Formally, a CFG is a
directed graph, whose nodes are bytecodes and whose edges represent possible
control flows. There are no cross-function edges. A CFG also records the IPD of
each node. IPDs are computed using an algorithm by Lengauer and Tarjan [32]
when the CFG is created. If the CFG contains uncaught exceptions, we also
create a SEN. For a CFG ζ and a non-branching node ι ∈ ζ, Succ(ζ, ι) denotes
ι’s unique successor. For a conditional branching node ι, Left(ζ, ι) and Right(ζ, ι)
denote successors when the condition is true and false, respectively.
The bytecode interpreter is a standard stack machine, with support for JS
features like scope chains and prototype chains. The state of the machine (with
our instrumentation) is a quadruple 〈ι, θ, σ, ρ〉, where ι represents the current
node that is being executed, θ represents the heap, σ represents the call-stack
and ρ is the pc-stack.
We assume an abstract, countable set A = {a, b, . . .} of heap locations, which
are references to objects. The heap θ is a partial map from locations to objects.
An object O may be:
– An ordinary JS object N = ({pi 7→ vi}ni=0,__proto__ 7→ a`p , `s), con-
taining properties named p0, . . . , pn that map to labeled values v0, . . . , vn, a
prototype field that points to a parent at heap location a, and two labels `p
and `s. `p records the pc where the object was created. `s is the so-called
structure label, which is an upper bound on all pcs that have influenced
which fields exist in the object.5
– A function object F = (N, ζ,Σ), where N is an ordinary object, ζ is a CFG,
which corresponds to the the function stored in the object, and Σ is the
scope chain (closing context) of the function.
A labeled value v = r` is a value r paired with a security label `. A value r
in our model may be a heap location a or a JS primitive value n, which includes
integers, Booleans, regular expressions, arrays, strings and the special JS values
undefined and null.
The call-stack σ contains one call-frame for each incomplete function call. A
call-frame µ contains an array of registers for local variables, a CFG ζ for the
function represented by the call-frame, the return address (a node in the CFG of
the previous frame), and a pointer to a scope-chain that allows access to variables
in outer scopes. Additionally, each call-frame has an exception table which maps
each potentially exception-throwing bytecode in the function to the exception
handler within the function that surrounds the bytecode; when no such exception
handler exists, it points to the SEN of the function (we conservatively assume
that any unknown code may throw an exception, so bytecodes call and eval
are exception-throwing for this purpose). |σ| denotes the size of the call-stack
and !σ its top frame. Each register contains a labeled value.
A scope chain, Σ, is a sequence of scope chain nodes (SCNs), denoted S,
paired with labels. In WebKit, a scope chain node S may either be an object
or a variable environment V , which is an array of labeled values. Thus, Σ ::=
(S1, `1) : . . . : (Sn, `n) and S ::= O | V and V ::= v1 : . . . : vn.
5 The __proto__ field is the parent of the object; it is not the same as the prototype
field of a function object, which is an ordinary property. Also, in our actual model,
fields pi map to more general property descriptors that also contain attributes along
with labeled values. We elide attributes here to keep the presentation simple.
Each entry of the pc-stack ρ is a triple (`, ι, p), where ` is a security label,
ι is a node in a CFG, and p is a pointer to some call-frame on the call stack
σ. (For simplicity, we ignore a fourth Boolean field described in Section 4.1 in
this presentation.) When we enter a new control context, we push the new pc `
together with the IPD ι of the entry point of the control context and a pointer
p to current call-frame. The pair (ι, p) uniquely identifies where the control of
the context ends; p is necessary to distinguish the same branch point in different
recursive calls of the function [12]. In our semantics, we use the meta-function
isIPD to pop the stack. It takes the current instruction, the current pc-stack and
the call stack σ, and returns a new pc-stack.
isIPD(ι, ρ, σ) :=
{
ρ.pop() if !ρ = (_, ι, !σ)
ρ otherwise
As explained in Section 4.1, as an optimization, we push a new node (`, ι, σ)
onto ρ only when (ι, σ) (the IPD) differs from the corresponding pair on the top
of the stack and, to handle exceptions correctly, we also require that ι not be
the SEN. Otherwise, we just join ` with the label on the top of the stack. This
is formalized in the function ρ.push(`, ι, σ), whose obvious definition we elide.
If x is a pair of any syntactic entity and a security label, we write Υ (x) for the
entity and Γ (x) for the label. In particular, for v = r`, Υ (v) = r and Γ (v) = `.
5.2 Semantics and IFC with Intra-procedural CFGs
We now present the semantics, which faithfully models our implementation us-
ing intra-procedural CFGs with SENs. The semantics is defined as a set of state
transition rules that define the judgment: 〈ι, θ, σ, ρ〉 〈ι′, θ′, σ′, ρ′〉. Fig. 2 shows
rules for selected bytecodes. For reasons of space we omit rules for other byte-
codes and formal descriptions of some meta-function like opCall that are used
in the rules. C ⇒ A B is shorthand for a meta-level (if (C) then A else B).
prim reads the values from two registers src1 and src2, performs a binary
operation generically denoted by ⊕ on the values and writes the result into the
register dst. dst is assigned the join of the labels in src1, src2 and the head of
the pc-stack (!ρ). To implement deferred NSU (Section 4.1), the existing label
in dst is compared with the current pc. If the label is lower than the pc, then
the label of dst is joined with ?. Note that the premise ρ′ = isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ) pops
an entry from the pc-stack if its IPD matches the new program node ι′. This
premise occurs in all semantic rules.
jfalse is a conditional jump. It skips offset number of successive nodes
in the CFG if the register cond contains false, else it falls-through to the next
node. Formally, the node it branches to is either Right(ζ, ι) or Left(ζ, ι), where ζ
is the CFG in !σ. In accordance with deferred NSU, the operation is performed
only if cond is not labeled ?. jfalse also starts a new control context, so a new
node is pushed on the top of the pc-stack with a label that is the join of Γ (cond)
and the current label on the top of the stack (unless the IPD of the branch point
is already on top of the stack or it is the SEN, in which case we join the new
prim:
ι = “op-prim dst:r src1:r src2:r”,
L := Γ (!σ(src1)) unionsq Γ (!σ(src2)) unionsq Γ (!ρ),
V := Υ (!σ(src1))⊕ Υ (!σ(src2))
(Γ (!σ(dst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ)) =⇒ (L := L)  (L := ?)
σ′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ(dst)):=V
Γ (!σ(dst)):=L
]
,
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι), ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
jfalse:
ι = “op-jfalse cond:r target:offset”,
Γ (!σ(cond)) 6= ?, L := Γ (!σ(cond)) unionsq Γ (!ρ),
Υ (!σ(cond)) = false =⇒ ι′ := Left(!σ.CFG, ι)
ι′ := Right(!σ.CFG, ι),
ρ′′ := ρ.push(L, IPD(ι),CF(ι)), ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ′′, σ)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ, ρ′
put-by-id:
ι = “op-put-by-id base:r prop:id value:r direct:b”,
Γ (!σ(value)) 6= ?, direct = true =⇒
θ′ := putDirect(Γ (!ρ), σ, θ, base, prop, value) 
θ′ := putIndirect(Γ (!ρ), σ, θ, base, prop, value),
ι′ := Succ(!σ.CFG, ι), ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ′, σ, ρ′
push-scope:
ι = “op-push-scope scope:r”,
σ′ := pushScope(Γ(!ρ), σ, scope),
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι), ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
call:
ι = “op-call func:r args:n”,
Γ (func) 6= ?, (ι′, σ′, `f ) := opCall(σ, ι, func, args),
L = `f unionsq Γ (!σ(func)) unionsq Γ (!ρ),
ρ′′ := ρ.push(L, IPD(ι),CF(ι)), ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ′′, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
ret:
ι = “op-ret res:r”,
(ι′, σ′, γ) := opRet(σ, res), ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
throw:
ι = “op-throw ex:r”, excValue := Υ (!σ(ex)),
(σ′, ι′) := throwException(σ, ι), ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
Fig. 2. Semantics, selected rules
label with the previous). Traversed from bottom to top, the pc-stack always has
monotonically non-decreasing labels.
put-by-id updates the property prop in the object pointed to by register
base. As explained in Section 4.1, we allow this only if the value to be written is
not labeled ?. The flag direct states whether or not to traverse the prototype
chain in finding the property; it is set by the compiler as an optimization. If the
flag is true, then the chain is not traversed (meta-function putDirect handles this
case). If direct is false, then the chain is traversed (meta-function putIndirect).
Importantly, when the chain is traversed, the resulting value is labeled with the
join of prototype labels `p and structure labels `s of all traversed objects. This
is standard and necessary to prevent implicit leaks through the __proto__
pointers and structure changes to objects.
push-scope, which corresponds to the start of the JS construct with(obj),
pushes the object pointed to by the register scope into the scope chain. Because
pushing an object into the scope chain can implicitly leak information from the
program context later, we also label all nodes in the scope-chain with the pc’s at
which they were added to the chain. Further, deferred NSU applies to the scope
chain pointer in the call-frame as it does to all other registers.
call invokes a function of the target object stored in the register func. Due
to deferred NSU, the call proceeds only if Γ (func) is not ?. The call creates a new
call-frame and initializes arguments, the scope chain pointer (initialized with the
function object’s Σ field), CFG and the return node in the new frame. The CFG
in the call-frame is copied from the function object pointed to by func. All this
is formalized in the meta-function opCall, whose details we omit here. Call is a
branch instruction and it pushes a new label on the pc-stack which is the join of
the current pc, Γ (func) and the structure label `f of the function object (unless
the IPD of the current node is the SEN or already on the top of the pc-stack, in
which case we join the new pc-label with the previous). call also initializes the
new registers’ labels to the new pc. A separate bytecode, not shown here and
executed first in the called function, sets register values to undefined. eval is
similar to call but the code to be executed is also compiled.
ret exits a function. It returns control to the caller, as formalized in the
meta-function opRet. The return value is written to an interpreter variable (γ).
throw throws an exception, passing the value in register ex as argument to
the exception handler. Our pc-stack push semantics ensure that the exception
handler, if any, is present in the call-frame pointed to by the top of the pc-stack.
The meta-function throwException pops the call-stack up to this call-frame and
transfers control to the exception handler, by looking it up in the exception
table of the call-frame. The exception value in the register ex is transferred to
the handler through an interpreter variable.
The semantics of other bytecodes have been described in Section 8.3.
Correctness of IFC We prove that our IFC analysis guarantees termination-
insensitive non-interference [11]. Intuitively, this means that if a program is run
twice from two states that are observationally equivalent for the adversary and
both executions terminate, then the two final states are also equivalent for the
adversary. To state the theorem formally, we formalize equivalence for various
data structures in our model. The only nonstandard data structure we use is the
CFG, but graph equality suffices for it. A well-known complication is that low
heap locations allocated in the two runs need not be identical. We adopt the
standard solution of parametrizing our definitions of equivalence with a partial
bijection β between heap locations. The idea is that two heap locations are
related in the partial bijection if they were created by corresponding allocations
in the two runs. We then define a rather standard relation 〈ι1, θ1, σ1, ρ1〉 ∼β`
〈ι2, θ2, σ2, ρ2〉, which means that the states on the left and right are equivalent
to an observer at level `, up to the bijection β on heap locations. The details
have been presented in Section 8.4.
Theorem 1 (Termination-insensitive non-interference) Suppose:
(1) 〈ι1, θ1, σ1, ρ1〉 ∼β` 〈ι2, θ2, σ2, ρ2〉, (2) 〈ι1, θ1, σ1, ρ1〉  ∗ 〈end, θ′1, [], []〉, and
(3) 〈ι2, θ2, σ2, ρ2〉 ∗ 〈end, θ′2, [], []〉. Then, ∃β′ ⊇ β such that θ′1 ∼β
′
` θ
′
2.
6 Implementation
We instrumented WebKit’s JS engine (JavaScriptCore) to implement the IFC
semantics of the previous section. Before a function starts executing, we generate
its CFG and calculate IPDs of its nodes by static analysis of its bytecode. We
modify the source-to-bytecode compiler to emit a slightly different, but function-
ally equivalent bytecode sequence for finally blocks; this is needed for accurate
computation of IPDs. For evaluation purposes, we label each source script with
the script’s domain of origin; each seen domain is dynamically allocated a bit in
our bit-set label. In general, our instrumentation terminates a script that violates
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Fig. 3. Overheads of basic and optimized IFC in SunSpider benchmarks
IFC. However, for the purpose of evaluating overhead of our instrumentation,
we ignore IFC violations in all experiments described here.
We also implement and evaluate a variant of sparse labeling [21] which opti-
mizes the common case of computations that mostly use local variables (registers
in the bytecode). Until a function reads a value from the heap with a label differ-
ent from the pc, we propagate taints only on heap-writes, but not on in-register
computations. Until that point, all registers are assumed to be implicitly tainted
with pc. This simple optimization reduces the overhead incurred by taint track-
ing significantly in microbenchmarks. For both the basic and optimized version,
our instrumentation adds approximately 4,500 lines of code to WebKit.
Our baseline for evaluation is the uninstrumented interpreter with JIT dis-
abled. For comparison, we also include measurements with JIT enabled. Our
experiments are based on WebKit build #r122160 running in Safari 6.0. The
machine has a 3.2GHz Quad-core Intel Xeon processor with 8GB RAM and
runs Mac OS X version 10.7.4.
Microbenchmark We executed the standard SunSpider 1.0.1 JS benchmark suite
on the uninstrumented interpreter with JIT disabled and JIT enabled, and on
the basic and the optimized IFC instrumentations with JIT disabled. Results are
shown in Figure 3. The x-axis ranges over SunSpider tests and the y-axis shows
the average execution time, normalized to our baseline (uninstrumented inter-
preter with JIT disabled) and averaged across 100 runs. Error bars are standard
deviations. Although the overheads of IFC vary from test to test, the average
overheads over our baseline are 121% and 45% for basic IFC and optimized
IFC, respectively. The test regexp has almost zero overhead because it spends
most time in native code, which we have not yet instrumented. We also note
that, as expected, the JIT-enabled configuration performs extremely well on the
SunSpider benchmarks.
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Macrobenchmarks We measured the execution time of the intial JS on 9 popular
English language Websites. We load each Website in Safari and measure the
total time taken to execute the JS code without user interaction. This excludes
time for network communication and internal browser events and establishes a
very conservative baseline. The results, normalized to our baseline, are shown in
Fig. 4. Our overheads are all less than 42% (with an average of around 29% in
both instrumentations). Interestingly, we observe that our optimization is less
effective on real websites indicating that real JS accesses the heap more often
than the SunSpider tests. When compared to the amount of time it takes to
fetch a page over the network and to render it, these overheads are negligible.
Enabling JIT worsens performance compared to our baseline indicating that, for
the code executed here, JIT is not useful.
We also experimented with JSBench [33], a sophisticated benchmark derived
from JS code in the wild. The average overhead on all JSBench tests (a total 23
iterations) is approximately 38% for both instrumentations. The average time
for running the benchmark tests on the uninstrumented interpreter with JIT
disabled was about 636.11ms with a standard deviation of about 0.30% of the
mean. The average time for running the same benchmark tests on the instru-
mented interpreter and the optimized version was about 874.31ms and 880.85ms
respectively, with a standard deviation of about 4.09% and 5.04% of the mean
in the two cases.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have explored dynamic information flow control for JS bytecode in WebKit,
a production JS engine. We formally model the bytecode, its semantics, our
instrumentation and prove the latter correct. We identify challenges, largely
arising from pervasive use of unstructured control flow in bytecode, and resolve
them using very limited static analysis. Our evaluation indicates only moderate
overheads in practice.
In ongoing work, we are instrumenting the DOM and other native JS meth-
ods. We also plan to generalize our model and non-interference theorem to
take into account the reactive nature of Web browsers. Going beyond non-
interference, the design and implementation of a policy language for representing
allowed information flows looks necessary.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Data Structures
The formal model described in Section 5 was typechecked in C++. The vari-
ous data structures used for defining the functions used in the semantics of the
language are given in Figure 5. The source-code of the JavaScript program is
represented as a structure containing the source and a Boolean flag indicating
the strict mode is set or not. The instruction as indicated before is a structure
consisting of the opcode and the list of operands. The opcode is a string indicating
the operation and the operand is a union of registerIndex, immediateValue, iden-
tifier, Boolean, funcIndex and offset. The immediateValue denotes the directly
supplied value to an opcode, registerIndex is the index of the register containing
the value to be operated upon, identifier represents the string name directly
used by the opcode, Boolean is a often a flag indicating the truth value of some
parameter and offset represents the offset where the control jumps to. Similarly,
functionIndex indicates the index of the function object being invoked.
The function’s source code is represented in the form of a control flow graph
(CFG). Formally, it is defined as a struct with a list of CFG nodes, each of which
contain the instructions that are to be performed and the edges point to the
next instruction in the program. Multiple outgoing edges indicate a branching
instruction. It also contains variables indicating the number of variables used by
the function code and a reference to the globalObject.
The labels are interpreted as a structure consisting of long integer label. The
label represents the value of the label, which are interpreted as bit vectors. A
special label star which represents partially leaked data, is used for deferred no-
sensitive-upgrade check. The program counter (pc) is represented as a stack of
pc-nodes, each of which contains the context label and the IPD of the operation
that pushed the node, the callframe of the current node and the handler flag
indicating the presence of an exception handler.
Different types of values are used as operands for performing the operations.
They include Boolean, integer, string, double and objects or special values like
NaN or undefined. These values are associated with a label each and are wrapped
by the JSValue class. All the values used in the data structures have the type
JSValue. The objects consist of properties, a prototype chain pointer with an
associated label and a structure label for the object. The properties are repre-
sented as a structure of the propertyName and its descriptor. The descriptor of
the property contains the value, some Boolean flags and a property label. The
struct SourceCode{
String programSrc;
bool strictMode;
};
typedef char* Opcode;
union Operand{
int immediateValue;
String identifier;
int registerIndex;
int funcIndex;
bool flag;
int offset;
};
struct Instruction{
Opcode opc;
Operand* opr;
};
struct CFGNode{
Instruction* inst;
struct CFGNode* left;
struct CFGNode* right;
struct CFGNode* succ;
};
struct CFG{
struct CFGNode* cfgNode;
JSGlobalObject* globalObject;
int numVars;
int numFns;
bool strictMode;
};
struct JSLabel{
uint64_t label;
};
enum Specials{
NaN, undefined
};
union ValueType{
bool b;
int n;
String s;
double d;
JSObject* o;
};
union valueTemplate{
Specials s;
ValueType v;
};
struct JSValue{
valueTemplate data;
JSLabel label;
};
struct PropertyDescriptor{
JSValue value;
bool writable;
bool enumerable;
bool configurable;
JSLabel structLabel;
};
struct Property{
String propertyName;
PropertyDescriptor* pDesc;
};
struct PropertySlot{
Property prop;
PropertySlot* next;
};
struct JSObject{
Property property[MAX_PROPS];
struct proto{
JSLabel l;
JSObject* __proto__;
} prototype;
JSLabel structLabel;
};
struct Heap{
unsigned location;
JSObject o;
}[HEAP_SIZE];
enum FunctionType{
JSFunction, HostFunction
};
struct JSFunctionObject:
JSObject{
CFG* funcCFG;
ScopeChainNode* scopeChain;
FunctionType fType;
};
struct JSGlobalObject:
JSObject{
JSFunctionObject evalFunction;
JSObject* objectPrototype;
JSObject* functionPrototype;
};
struct Register{
JSValue value;
};
struct CallFrameNode{
Register rf[REGISTER_FILE_SIZE];
CFG cfg;
CFGNode* returnAddress;
ScopeChainNode* sc;
JSFunctionObject* callee;
JSLabel calleeLabel;
int argCount;
bool getter;
int dReg;
};
struct CallFrameStack{
CallFrameNode cFN;
CallFrameStack* previous;
};
struct PCNode{
JSLabel l;
CFGNode* ipd;
CallFrameNode* cFN;
bool handler;
};
struct PCStack{
PCNode node;
PCStack* previous;
};
struct JSActivation{
CallFrameNode* callFrameNode;
JSLabel structLabel;
};
enum ScopeChainObjectType{
LexicalObject, VariableObject
};
union SChainObject{
JSObject* obj;
JSActivation* actObj;
};
struct ScopeChainNode{
SChainObject Object;
ScopeChainObjectType scObjType;
ScopeChainNode* next;
JSLabel scopeLabel;
};
Fig. 5. Data Structures
heap is a collection of objects with an associated memory address. It is essentially
a map from location to object.
There are subtypes of JSObject that define the function object and the global
object. The function object contains a pointer to the associated CFG and the
scope chain. It also contains a field defining the type of function it represents,
namely, host or user-defined.
The call-stack is made up of various call-frame nodes, each of which contains a
set of registers, the associated CFG, the return address of the function, a pointer
to the scope chain, and an exception table. The registers store values and objects
and are used as operands for performing the operations. The exception table
contains the details about the handlers associated with different instructions in
the CFG of the call-frame. The scope chain is a list of nodes containing objects or
activation objects along with a label indicating the context in which the object
in that node was added. The activation object is a structure containing a pointer
to the call-frame node for which the activation object was created.
The next section defines the different procedures used in the semantics of the
language. The statement stop implies that the program execution hangs.
8.2 Algorithms
The different meta-functions used in the semantics presented in Section 8.3 are
described below:
procedure isInstanceOf (JSLabel context, JSValue obj, JSValue protoVal)
oProto := obj.prototype.__proto__
while oProto do
if oProto = protoVal then
ret := JSValue::construct(true)
ret.label := context
return ret
end if
oProto := oProto.prototype.__proto__
context := context.Join(oProto.prototype.l)
end while
ret := JSValue::construct(false)
ret.label := context
return ret
end procedure
procedure opRet(CallFrameStack* callStack, int ret)
JSValue retValue = callStack.cFN.rf[ret].value
if hostCallFrameFlag then
callStack.pop()
return nil, callStack, retValue
end if
callStack.pop()
return callStack.cFN.returnAddress, callStack, retValue
end procedure
procedure opCall(CallFrameStack* callStack, CFGNode* ip, int func, int argCount)
JSValue funcValue := callStack.cFN.rf[func].value
JSFunctionObject fObj
CallFrameNode *sigmaTop := new CallFrameNode()
CallFrameNode *prevTop := callStack.top()
callStack.push(sigmaTop)
CallType callType := getCallData(funcValue, &fObj)
if callType = CallTypeJS then
ScopeChainNode* sc := fObj.scopeChain
callStack.cFN.cfg := fObj.funcCFG
callStack.cFN.returnAddress := ip.Succ
callStack.cFN.sc := sc
args.noOfArgs := argCount
callStack.cFN.argCount := argCount
for i ← 0, argCount do
callStack.cFN.rf[sigmaTop.baseRegister() + i].value :=
prevTop.rf[prevTop.headRegister()-i].value
end for
ip := callStack.cFN.cfg.cfgNode
else if callType = CallTypeHost then
stop . Not modeled
end if
retState.ip := ip
retState.sigma := callStack
return retState
end procedure
procedure opCallEval(JSLabel contextLabel, CallFrameStack* callStack, CFGNode* ip, int func,
int argCount)
JSValue funcValue := callStack.cFN.rf[func].value
JSFunctionObject* fObj
JSObject* variableObject
Argument* arguments
if isHostEval(funcValue) then
ScopeChainNode* sc := fObj.scopeChain
callStack.cFN.returnAddress := ip + 1
callStack.cFN.sc := sc
callStack.cFN.argCount := argCount
SourceCode progSrc := funcValue.getSource()
Compiler::preparse(progSrc)
CFG* evalCodeBlock := Compiler::compile(progSrc)
unsigned numVars := evalCodeBlock.numVariables()
unsigned numFuncs := evalCodeBlock.numFuncDecls()
if numVars || numFuncs then
if evalCodeBlock.strictMode then
JSActivation* variableObject := new JSActivation()
variableObject.create(callStack)
SChainObject* scObj
scObj.actObj := variableObject
sc.push(scObj, variableObject, contextLabel)
else
for (ScopeChainNode* n := sc;; n := n.next) do
if n.isVariableObject() && !n.isLexicalObject() then
variableObject := n.getObject()
break
end if
end for
end if
for i ← 0, numVars do
Identifier iden := evalCodeBlock.variable(i)
if !variableObject.hasProperty(iden) then
variableObject.insertVariable(iden)
end if
end for
for i ← 0, numFuncs do
JSFunctionObject* fObj := evalCodeBlock.funcDecl(i)
variableObject.insertFunction(fObj)
end for
end if
callStack.cFN.cfg := evalCodeBlock
ip := evalCodeBlock.cfgNode
retState.ip := ip
retState.sigma := callStack
return retState
else
return opCall(contextLabel, callStack, ip, func, argCount)
end if
end procedure
procedure createArguments(Heap* h, CallFrameStack* callStack)
JSObject* jsArgument := JSArgument::create(h, callStack)
h.o[++(h.location)] := *jsArgument
retState.theta := h
retState.val := JSValue::construct(jsArgument)
return retState
end procedure
procedure newFunc(CallFrameStack* callStack, Heap* heap, int funcIndex, JSLabel context)
CFG* cBlock := callStack.cFN.cfg
SourceCode fcCode := cBlock.getFunctionSrc(funcIndex)
CFG* fcBlock := Compiler::compile(fcCode,callStack.cFN)
JSFunctionObject* fObj := JSFunctionObject::create( fcBlock,callStack.cFN.sc)
fObj.structLabel := context
heap.o[++(heap.location)] := *fObj
retState.theta := heap
retState.val := JSValue::construct(fObj)
return retState
end procedure
procedure createActivation(CallFrameStack* callStack, JSLabel contextLabel)
JSActivation* jsActivation := new JSActivation()
jsActivation.create(callStack)
jsActivation.structLabel := contextLabel
SChainObject* scObj
scObj.actObj := jsActivation
JSValue vActivation := JSValue::jsValuefromActivation (jsActivation)
if callStack.cFN.scopeLabel ≥ contextLabel then
callStack.cFN.sc.push(scObj, VariableObject, contextLabel)
callStack.cFN.scopeLabel := contextLabel
else
stop
end if
return retState
end procedure
procedure createThis(JSLabel contextLabel, CallFrameStack* callStack, Heap* h)
JSFunctionObject* callee := callStack.cFN.callee
PropertySlot p(callee)
String str := "prototype"
JSValue proto := p.getValue(str)
JSObject* obj := new JSObject()
obj.structLabel := contextLabel
obj.prototype.__proto__ := proto.toObject()
obj.prototype.l := proto.toObject().structLabel.join( contextLabel)
h.o[++(h.location)] := *obj
retState.theta := h
retState.val := JSValue::construct(obj)
return retState
end procedure
procedure newObject(Heap* h, JSLabel contextLabel)
JSObject* obj := emptyObject()
obj.structLabel := contextLabel
obj.prototype.__proto__ := ObjectPrototype::create()
obj.prototype.l := contextLabel
h.o[++(h.location)] := *obj
retState.theta := h
retState.val := JSValue::construct(obj)
return retState
end procedure
procedure getPropertyById(JSValue v, String p, int dst)
JSObject* O := v.toObject()
JSLabel label := O.structLabel
JSValue ret := jsUndefined()
if O.isUndefined() then
ret.label := label
return ret
end if
while O 6= null do
if O.containsProperty(p) then
if p.isGetter() then
JSValue v = p.getValue()
JSFunctionObject* funcObj = (JSFunctionObject*) v.toObject()
CallFrameNode *sigmaTop = new CallFrameNode()
callStack.push(sigmaTop)
ScopeChainNode* sc = fObj.scopeChain
CFG* newCodeBlock = fObj.funcCFG
callStack.cFN.cfg = *newCodeBlock
callStack.cFN.returnAddress = ip + 1
callStack.cFN.sc = sc
callStack.cFN.getter = true
callStack.cFN.dReg = dst
ip = newCodeBlock.cfgNode
interpreter.iota = ip
interpreter.sigma = callStack
else
ret := getProperty(p).getValue()
ret.label := label
end if
return ret
else
O := O.prototype.__proto__
end if
label := label.join(label)
end while
end procedure
procedure putDirect(JSLabel contextLabel, CallFrameStack* callStack, Heap* h, int base, String
property, int propVal)
JSValue baseValue := callStack.cFN.rf[base]. value
JSValue propValue := callStack.cFN.rf[propVal]. value
JSObject* obj := baseValue.toObject()
PropertyDescriptor dataPD := PropertyDescriptor::createPD(true, true, true)
dataPD.value := propValue
obj.setProperty(property, dataPD)
obj.structLabel := obj.structLabel.join(contextLabel)
h.o[++(h.location)] := *obj
return h
end procedure
procedure putIndirect(JSLabel contextLabel, CallFrameStack* callStack, Heap* h, int base,
String property, int val)
JSValue baseValue := callStack.cFN.rf[base].value
JSValue propValue := callStack.cFN.rf[val].value
JSObject* obj := baseValue.toObject()
bool isStrict := callStack.cFN.cfg.isStrictMode()
contextLabel := obj.structLabel.join(contextLabel)
if obj.containsPropertyInItself(property) && obj. getProperty(property).isDataProperty() &&
!isStrict && obj.isWritable() then
obj.getProperty(property).setValue(propValue)
h.o[++(h.location)] := *obj
return h
end if
return putDirect(contextLabel, callStack, h, base, property, val)
end procedure
procedure delById(JSLabel contextLabel, CallFrameStack* callStack, Heap* h, int base, Identi-
fier property)
JSValue baseValue := callStack.cFN.rf[base].value
JSObject* obj := baseValue.toObject()
int loc := h.findObject(obj)
Property prop := obj.getProperty(property)
PropertyDescriptor pd := prop.getPropertyDescriptor()
if obj.getPropertyValue(prop).label ≥ contextLabel then
if !obj.containsPropertyInItself(property) then
retState.theta := h
retState.val := JSValue::construct(true)
return retState
end if
if obj.containsPropertyInItself(property) && prop. isConfigurable() then
if !(callStack.cFN.cfg.isStrictMode()) then
pd.value := JSValue::constructUndefined()
obj.setProperty(property, pd)
h.o[loc] := *obj
retState.theta := h
retState.val := JSValue::construct(true)
return retState
end if
end if
retState.theta := h
retState.val := JSValue::construct(false)
return retState
else
stop
end if
end procedure
procedure putGetterSetter(JSLabel contextLabel, CallFrameStack* callStack, Heap* h, int base,
Identifier property, JSValue getterValue, JSValue setterValue)
JSValue baseValue := callStack.cFN.rf[base].value
JSObject* obj := baseValue.toObject()
int loc := h.findObject(obj)
JSFunctionObject *getterObj, *setterObj
JSFunctionObject *getterFuncObj := null, *setterFuncObj := null
if !getterValue.isUndefined() then
getterFuncObj := getterValue.toFunctionObject (callStack.cFN.cfg, callStack.cFN.sc)
end if
if !setterValue.isUndefined() then
setterFuncObj := setterValue.toFunctionObject (callStack.cFN.cfg, callStack.cFN.sc)
end if
if getterFuncObj 6= null then
obj.setGetter(property, getterObj)
end if
if setterFuncObj 6= null then
obj.setSetter(setterObj)
end if
PropertyDescriptor accessor := PropertyDescriptor ::createPD(false, false, false, true)
JSValue v := JSValue::constructUndefined()
v.label := contextLabel
accessor.value := v
obj.setProperty(property, accessor)
obj.structLabel := contextLabel
h.o[loc] := *obj
return h
end procedure
procedure getPropNames(CallFrameStack* callStack, Instruction* ip, int base, int i, int size, int
breakOffset)
JSValue baseVal := callStack.cFN.rf[base].value
JSObject* obj := baseVal.toObject()
PropertyIterator* propItr := obj.getProperties()
if baseVal.isUndefined() || baseVal.isNull() then
retState.v1 := jsUndefined()
retState.v2 := jsUndefined()
retState.v3 := jsUndefined()
retState.ip := ip + breakOffset
return retState
end if
retState.v1 := JSValue::construct(propItr)
retState.v2 := JSValue::construct(0)
retState.v3 := JSValue::construct(propItr.size())
retState.ip := ip + 1
return retState
end procedure
procedure getNextPropName(CallFrameStack* cStack, Instruction* ip, JSValue base, int i, int
size, int iter, int offset, int dst)
JSObject* obj := base.toObject()
PropertyIterator* propItr := cStack.cFN.rf[iter].value. toPropertyIterator()
int b := rFile[i].value.toInteger()
int e := rFile[size].value.toInteger()
while b < e do
String key := propItr.get(b)
retState.value1 := JSValue::construct(b + 1)
if !(key.isNull()) then
retState.value2 := JSValue::construct(key)
ip := ip + offset
break
end if
b++
end while
return retState
end procedure
procedure resolveInSc(JSLabel contextLabel, ScopeChainNode* scopeHead, String property)
JSValue v
JSLabel l
ScopeChainNode* scn := scopeHead
while scn 6= NULL do
PropertySlot pSlot := scn.getPropertySlot()
if pSlot.contains(property) then
v := pSlot.getValue(property)
v.label := contextLabel
return v
end if
scn := scn.next
if scn.scObjType = VariableObject then
contextLabel = contextLabel.join(scn.Object. actObj.structLabel)
else if scn.scObjType = LexicalObject then
contextLabel = contextLabel.join(scn.Object. obj.structLabel)
end if
contextLabel := contextLabel.join(scn. scopeNextLabel)
end while
v := jsUndefined()
v.label := contextLabel
return v
end procedure
procedure resolveInScWithSkip(JSLabel contextLabel, ScopeChainNode* scopeHead, String prop-
erty, int skip)
JSValue v
JSLabel l
ScopeChainNode* scn := scopeHead
while skip−− do
scn := scn.next
if scn.scObjType = VariableObject then
contextLabel := contextLabel.join( scn.Object. actObj.structLabel)
else if scn.scObjType = LexicalObject then
contextLabel := contextLabel.join(scn.Object. obj.structLabel)
end if
contextLabel := contextLabel.join(scn. scopeNextLabel)
end while
while scn 6= null do
PropertySlot pSlot := scn.getPropertySlot()
if pSlot.contains(property) then
v := pSlot.getValue(property)
v.label := contextLabel
return v
end if
scn := scn.next
if scn.scObjType = VariableObject then
contextLabel := contextLabel.join(scn.Object. actObj.structLabel)
else if scn.scObjType = LexicalObject then
contextLabel := contextLabel.join(scn.Object. obj.structLabel)
end if
contextLabel := contextLabel.join(scn. scopeNextLabel)
end while
v := jsUndefined()
v.label := contextLabel
return v
end procedure
procedure resolveGlobal(JSLabel contextLabel, CallFrameStack* cStack, String property)
JSValue v
struct CFG* cBlock := cStack.cFN.cfg
JSGlobalObject* globalObject := cBlock. getGlobalObject()
PropertySlot pSlot(globalObject)
if pSlot.contains(property) then
v := pSlot.getValue(property)
v.label := contextLabel
return v
end if
v := jsUndefined()
v.label := contextLabel
return v
end procedure
procedure resolveBase(JSLabel contextLabel, CallFrameStack* cStack, ScopeChainNode* scope-
Head, String property, bool strict)
JSValue v
ScopeChainNode* scn := scopeHead
CFG *cBlock := cStack.cFN.cfg
JSGlobalObject *gObject := cBlock.globalObject
while scn 6= null do
JSObject* obj := scn.get()
contextLabel := obj.structLabel.join(contextLabel)
PropertySlot pSlot(obj)
if scn.next = null && strict && !pSlot.contains (property) then
v := emptyJSValue()
v.label := contextLabel
return v
end if
if pSlot.contains(property) then
v := JSValueContainingObject(obj)
v.label := contextLabel
return v
end if
scn := scn.next
if scn 6= null then
contextLabel := contextLabel.join(scn. scopeNextLabel)
end if
end while
v := JSValue::construct(gObject)
v.label := contextLabel
return v
end procedure
procedure resolveBaseAndProperty(JSLabel contextLabel, CallFrameStack cStack, int bRegis-
ter, int pRegister, String property)
JSValue v
ScopeChainNode* scn := cStack.cFN.sc
while scn 6= null do
JSObject* obj := scn.get()
contextLabel := obj.structLabel.join(contextLabel)
PropertySlot pSlot(obj)
if pSlot.contains(property) then
v := pSlot.getValue(property)
v.label := contextLabel
ret.val1 := v
v := JSValueContainingObject(obj)
v.label := contextLabel
ret.val2 := v
return ret
end if
scn := scn.next
if scn 6= null then
contextLabel := contextLabel.join(scn. scopeNextLabel)
end if
end while
end procedure
procedure getScopedVar(JSLabel contextLabel, CallFrameStack* callStack, Heap* h, int index,
int skip)
JSValue v
ScopeChainNode* scn := callStack.cFN.sc
while skip−− do
if scn.scObjType = VariableObject then
contextLabel := contextLabel.join(scn.Object.actObj. structLabel)
else if scn.scObjType = LexicalObject then
contextLabel := contextLabel.join(scn.Object.obj. structLabel)
end if
contextLabel := contextLabel.join(scn. scopeLabel)
scn := scn.next
end while
v := scn.registerAt(index)
if scn.scObjType = VariableObject then
v.label := contextLabel.join(scn.Object.actObj. structLabel)
else if scn.scObjType = LexicalObject then
v.label := contextLabel.join(scn.Object.obj. structLabel)
end if
return v
end procedure
procedure putScopedVar(JSLabel contextLabel, CallFrameStack* callStack, Heap* h, int index,
int skip, int value)
CallFrameStack* cStack
ScopeChainNode* scn := callStack.cFN.sc
JSValue val := callStack.cFN.rf[value].value
while skip−− do
if scn.scObjType = VariableObject then
contextLabel := contextLabel.join(scn.Object. actObj.structLabel)
else if scn.scObjType = LexicalObject then
contextLabel := contextLabel.join(scn.Object. obj.structLabel)
end if
contextLabel := contextLabel.join(scn. scopeLabel)
scn := scn.next
end while
cStack := scn.setRegisterAt(contextLabel, index, val)
return cStack
end procedure
procedure pushScope(JSLabel contextLabel, CallFrameStack* callStack, Heap* h, int scope)
ScopeChainNode* sc := callStack.cFN.sc
JSValue v := callStack.cFN.rf[scope].value
JSObject* o := v.toObject()
SChainObject* scObj
if sc.scopeLabel ≥ contextLabel then
scObj.obj := o
sc.push(scObj, LexicalObject, contextLabel)
callStack.cFN.sc := sc
else if sc.scopeLabel = star then
scObj.obj := o
sc.push(scObj, LexicalObject, star)
callStack.cFN.sc := sc
end if
return callStack
end procedure
procedure popScope(JSLabel contextLabel, CallFrameStack* callStack, Heap* h)
ScopeChainNode* sc := callStack.cFN.sc
JSLabel l := sc.scopeLabel
if l ≥ contextLabel then
sc.pop()
callStack.cFN.sc := sc
else
stop
end if
return callStack
end procedure
procedure jmpScope(JSLabel contextLabel, CallFrameStack* callStack, Heap* h, int count)
ScopeChainNode* sc := callStack.cFN.sc
while count−− > 0 do
JSLabel l := sc.scopeLabel
if l ≥ contextLabel then
sc.pop()
callStack.cFN.sc := sc
else
stop
end if
end while
return callStack
end procedure
procedure throwException(CallFrameStack* callStack, CFGNode* iota)
CFGNode* handler
while callStack.cFN.hasHandler()==false do
callStack.pop()
end while
while callStack.cFN.sc.length() - callStack.cFN.getHandlerScopeDepth() do
callStack.cFN.sc.pop()
end while
handler := callStack.cFN.getHandler(iota)
interpreter.iota := handler
interpreter.sigma := callStack
end procedure
8.3 Semantics
prim:
ι = “prim dst:r src1:r src2:r”
L := Γ (!σ(src1)) unionsq Γ (!σ(src2)) unionsq Γ (!ρ) V := Υ (!σ(src1))⊕ Υ (!σ(src2))
(Γ (!σ(dst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ (L := L)  (L := ?)
σ′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ(dst)):=V
Γ (!σ(dst)):=L
]
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
prim reads the values from two registers (src1 and src2), performs the binary
operation generically denoted by ⊕, and writes the result into the dst register.
The label assigned to the value in dst register is the join of the label of value in
src1, src2 and the head of the pc-stack (!ρ). In order to avoid implicit leak of
information, the label of the existing value in dst is compared with the current
context label. If the label is lower than the context label, the label of the value
in dst is set to ?.
mov:
ι = “mov dst:r src:r”
L := Γ (!σ(src)) unionsq Γ (!ρ) V = Υ (!σ(src))
(Γ (!σ(dst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ (L := L)  (L := ?)
σ′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ(dst)):=V
Γ (!σ(dst)):=L
]
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
mov copies the value from the src register to the dst register. The label assigned
to the value in dst register is the join of the label of value in src and the head
of the pc-stack (!ρ). In order to avoid implicit leak of information, the label of
the existing value in dst is compared with the current context label. If the label
is lower than the context label, the label of the value in dst is joined with ?.
jfalse:
ι = “jfalse cond:r target:offset”
Γ (!σ(cond)) 6= ? ρ′′ := ρ.push(Γ (!σ(cond)) unionsq Γ (!ρ), IPD(ι),CF(ι), false)
Υ (!σ(cond)) = false ⇒ ι′ := Left(!σ.CFG, ι)  ι′ := Right(!σ.CFG, ι)
ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ′′, σ)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ, ρ′
jfalse is a branching instruction. Based on the value in the cond register, it
decides which branch to take. The operation is performed only if the value in
cond is not labelled with a ?. If it contains a ?, we terminate the execution to
prevent possible leak of information. The push function defined in the rule does
the following: A node is pushed on the top of the pc-stack containing the IPD
of the branching instruction and the label of the value in cond joined with the
context, to define the context of this branch. If the IPD of the instruction is SEN
or the same as the top of the pc-stack, then we just join the label on top of the
pc-stack with the context label determined by the cond register.
loop-if-less:
ι = “loop-if-less src1:r src2:r target:offset”
Γ (!σ(src1)) 6= ? Γ (!σ(src2)) 6= ? L := Γ (!σ(src1)) unionsq Γ (!σ(src2)) unionsq Γ (!ρ)
Υ (!σ(src1)) < Υ (!σ(src2))⇒ ι′ := Left(!σ.CFG, ι)  ι′ := Right(!σ.CFG, ι)
ρ′′ := ρ.push(L, IPD(ι),CF(ι), false) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ′′, σ)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ, ρ′
loop-if-less is another branching instruction. If the value of src1 is less than
src2, then it jumps to the target, else continues with the next instruction. The
operation is performed only if the values in src1 and src2 are not labelled with
a ?. If any one of them contains a ?, we abort the execution to prevent possible
leak of information. The push function defined in the rule does the following: A
node is pushed on the top of the pc-stack containing the IPD of the branching
instruction and the join of the label of the values in src1 and src2 joined with
the context, to define the context of this branch. If the IPD of the instruction is
SEN or the same as the top of the pc-stack, then we just join the label on top
of the pc-stack with the context label determined above.
typeof:
ι = “typeof dst:r src:r”
L := (Γ (src) unionsq Γ (!ρ)) V := determineType(!σ(src))
(Γ (!σ(dst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ (L := L)  (L := ?)
σ′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ(dst)):=V
Γ (!σ(dst)):=L
]
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
typeof determines the type string for src according to ECMAScript rules, and
puts the result in register dst. We do a deferred NSU check on dst before writing
the result in it. The determineType function returns the data type of the value
passed as the parameter.
instanceof:
ι = “instanceof dst:r value:r cProt:r”
v := isInstanceOf (Γ (!ρ), !σ(value), cProt) L = Γ (v) V = Υ (v),
(Γ (!σ(dst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ (L := L)  (L := ?),
σ′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ(dst)):=V
Γ (!σ(dst)):=L
]
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
instanceof tests whether the cProt is in the prototype chain of the object in
register value and puts the Boolean result in the dst register after deferred NSU
check.
enter: ι = “enter” ι
′ := Succ(!σ.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ, ρ′
enter marks the beginning of a code block.
ret: ι = “ret res:r” (ι
′, σ′, γ) := opRet(σ, res) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
ret is the last instruction to be executed in a function. It pops the call-frame and
returns the control to the callee’s call-frame. The return value of the function is
written to a local variable in the interpreter (γ), which can be read by the next
instruction being executed.
end: ι = “end res:r” opEnd(σ, res)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  −
end marks the end of a program. opEnd passes the value present in res register
to the caller (the native function that invoked the interpreter).
call:
ι = “op-call func:r args:n”
Γ (func) 6= ? (ι′, σ′,H, `f ) := opCall(σ, ι, func, args)
ρ′′ := ρ.push(`f unionsq Γ (!σ(func)) unionsq Γ (!ρ), IPD(ι),CF(ι),H) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ′′, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
call, initially, checks the function object’s label for ? and if the label contains a
?, the program execution is aborted. The reason for termination is the possible
leak of information as explained above. If not, call creates a new call-frame,
copies the arguments, initializes the registers, scope-chain pointer, codeblock
and the return address. The registers are initialized to undefined and assigned
a label obtained by joining the label of the context in which the function was
created and the label of the function object itself. We treat call as a branching
instruction and hence, push a new node on the top of the pc-stack with the
label determined above along with its IPD and call-frame. The field H in the
push function is determined by looking up the exception table. If it contains
an associated exception handler, it sets the field to true else it is set to false.
If the IPD is the SEN then we just join the label on the top of the stack with
the currently calculated label. It then points the instruction pointer to the first
instruction of the new code block.
call-put-result:
ι = “call-put-result res:r”
L := Γ (γ) unionsq Γ (!ρ) V := Υ (γ)
(Γ (!σ(res)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ L := L  L := ?
σ′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ(res)):=V
Γ (!σ(res)):=L
]
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
call-put-result copies the return value γ to the res register. The label assigned
to the value in res register is the join of the label of the return value and the
head of the pc-stack. In order to avoid implicit leak of information, deferred
no-sensitive-upgrade is performed.
call-eval:
ι = “call-eval func:r args:n”
Γ (!σ(func)) 6= ? (ι′, σ′,H, `f ) := opCallEval(Γ(!ρ), σ, ι, func, args)
ρ′′ := ρ.push(`f unionsq Γ (!σ(func)) unionsq Γ (!ρ), IPD(ι),CF(ι),H) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ′′, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
call-eval calls a function with the string passed as an argument converted to a
code block. If func register contains the original global eval function, then it is
performed in local scope, else it is similar to call.
create-arguments:
ι = “create-arguments dst:r”
(θ′, v) := createArguments(θ, σ) L := Γ (!ρ) V := Υ (v)
(Γ (!σ(dst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ L := L  L := ?
σ′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ(dst)):=V
Γ (!σ(dst)):=L
]
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ′, σ′, ρ′
create-arguments creates the arguments object and places its pointer in the local
dst register after the deferred NSU check. The label of the arguments object is
set to the context.
new-func:
ι = “new-func dst:r funcIndex:f”
(θ′, v) := newFunc(σ, θ, funcIndex,Γ(!ρ)) L := Γ (v) unionsq Γ (!ρ) V := Υ (v)
(Γ (!σ(dst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ L := L  L := ?
σ′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ(dst)):=V
Γ (!σ(dst)):=L
]
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ′, σ′, ρ′
new-func constructs a new function instance from function at funcIndex and the
current scope chain and puts the result in dst after deferred NSU check.
create-activation:
ι = “create-activation dst:r”
(σ′, v) := createActivation(σ,Γ(!ρ)) L := Γ (v) unionsq Γ (!ρ) V := Υ (v)
(Γ (!σ(dst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ L := L  L := ?
σ′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ′′(dst)):=V
Γ (!σ′′(dst)):=L
]
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
create-activation creates the activation object for the current call-frame if it has
not been already created and writes it to the dst after the deferred NSU check
and pushes the object in the scope-chain. If the label of the head of the existing
scope-chain is less than the context, then the label of the pushed node is set to
?, else it is set to the context.
construct:
ι = “construct func:r args:n”
Γ (!σ(func)) 6= ? (ι′, σ′,H, `f ) := opCall(σ, ι, func, args)
ρ′′ := ρ.push(`f unionsq Γ (!σ′(func)) unionsq Γ (!ρ), IPD(ι),CF(ι),H) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ′′, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
construct invokes register func as a constructor and is similar to call. For Java-
Script functions, the this object being passed (the first argument in the list of
arguments) is a new object. For host constructors, no this is passed.
create-this:
ι = “create-this dst:r”
(θ′, v) := createThis(Γ(!ρ), σ, θ) L := Γ (v) unionsq Γ (!ρ) V := Υ (v)
(Γ (!σ(dst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ L := L  L := ?
σ′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ(dst)):=V
Γ (!σ(dst)):=L
]
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ′, σ′, ρ′
create-this creates and allocates an object as this used for construction later in
the function. The object is labelled the context and placed in dst after deferred
NSU check. The prototype chain pointer is also labelled with the context label.
new-object:
ι = “new-object dst:r”
(θ′, v) := newObject(θ, Γ (!ρ)) L := Γ (v) unionsq Γ (!ρ) V := Υ (v)
(Γ (!σ(dst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ (L := L)  (L := ?)
σ′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ(dst)):=V
Γ (!σ(dst)):=L
]
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ′, σ′, ρ′
new-object constructs a new empty object instance and puts it in dst after de-
ferred NSU check. The object is labelled with the context label and the prototype
chain pointer is also labelled with the context.
get-by-id:
ι = “get-by-id dst:r base:r prop:id vdst:r”
v := getPropertyById(!σ(base), prop, vdst) L := Γ (v) unionsq Γ (!ρ) V := Υ (v)
(Γ (!σ(dst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ (L := L)  (L := ?)
σ′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ(dst)):=V
Γ (!σ(dst)):=L
]
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
get-by-id gets the property named by the identifier prop from the object in the
base register and puts it into the dst register after the deferred NSU check. If
the object does not contain the property, it looks up the prototype chain to
determine if any of the proto objects contain the property. When traversing the
prototype chain, the context is joined with the structure label of all the objects
and the prototype chain pointer labels until the property is found or the end of
the chain. It then joins the property label to the context. If the property is not
found, it returns undefined. The joined label of the context is the label of the
property put in the dst register.
If the property is an accessor property, it calls the getter function, sets the
getter flag in the call-frame and updates the destination register field with the
register where the value is to be inserted. It then transfers the control to the
first instruction in the getter function.
put-by-id:
ι = “put-by-id base:r prop:id value:r direct:b”
Γ (!σ(value)) 6= ?
(direct = true ⇒ θ′ := putDirect(Γ (!ρ), σ, θ, base, prop, value) 
θ′ := putIndirect(Γ (!ρ), σ, θ, base, prop, value))
ι′ := Succ(!σ.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ′, σ, ρ′
put-by-id writes into the heap the property of an object. We check for ? in
the label of value register. If it contains a ?, the program aborts as this could
potentially result in an implicit information flow. If not, it writes the property
into the object. The basic functionality is to search for the property in the object
and its prototype chain, and change it. If the property is not found, a new
property for the current object with the property label as the context is created.
Based on whether the property is in the object itself (or needs to be created in
the object itself) or in the prototype chain of the object, it calls putDirect and
putIndirect, respectively.
del-by-id:
ι = “del-by-id dst:r base:r prop:id”
Γ (!σ(base)) 6= ? (θ′, v) := delById(Γ (!ρ), σ, θ, base, prop) L := Γ (v) unionsq Γ (!ρ)
V := Υ (v) (Γ (!σ(dst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ (L := L)  (L := ?)
σ′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ(dst)):=V
Γ (!σ(dst)):=L
]
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ′, σ′, ρ′
del-by-id deletes the property specified by prop in the object contained in base.
If the structure label of the object is less than the context, the deletion does not
happen. If the property is found, the property is deleted and Boolean value true
is written to dst, else it writes false to dst. The label of the Boolean value is the
structure label of the object joined with the property label.
getter-setter:
ι = “put-getter-setter base:r prop:id getter:r setter:r”,
? /∈ Γ (!σ(getter)), ? /∈ Γ (!σ(setter)),
θ′ := putGetterSetter(Γ(!ρ), σ, base, prop, !σ(getter), !σ(setter)),
ι′ := Succ(!σ.CFG, ι), ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ′, σ, ρ′
getter-setter puts the accessor descriptor to the object in register base. It initially
checks if the structure label of the object is greater or equal to the context. The
property for which the accessor properties are added is given in the register prop.
The property label of the accessor functions is set to the context. putGetterSetter
calls putIndirect internally and sets the getter/setter property of the object with
the specified value.
get-pnames:
ι = “get-pnames dst:r base:r i:r size:r breakTarget:offset”
Γ (!σ(base)) 6= ? (v1, v2, v3, ι′) := getPropNames(σ, ι, base, i, size, breakTarget)
Ln := Γ (!σ(base)) unionsq Γ (vn) unionsq Γ (!ρ) Vn := Υ (vn), n := 1, 2, 3
(Γ (!σ(dst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ (L1 := L1)  (L1 := ?)
(Γ (!σ(i)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ (L2 := L2)  (L2 := ?)
(Γ (!σ(size)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ (L3 := L3)  (L3 := ?)
σ′′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ(dst)):=V1
Γ (!σ(dst)):=L1
]
σ′′′ := σ′′
[
Υ (!σ′′(i)):=V2
Γ (!σ′′(i)):=L2
]
σ′ := σ′′′
[
Υ (!σ′′′(size)):=V3
Γ (!σ′′′(size)):=L3
]
vn = undefined ⇒ (L = Γ (!σ(base))) 
(L = Γ (!σ(base)) unionsq Γ(θ(!σ(base))) unionsq (∀p ∈ Prop(θ(!σ(base))).Γ(p)))
ρ′′ = ρ.push(L, IPD(ι),CF(ι), false) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ′′, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
get-pnames creates a property name list for object in register base and puts it in
dst, initializing i and size for iteration through the list, after the deferred NSU
check. If base is undefined or null, it jumps to breakTarget. It is a branching
instruction and pushes the label with join of all the property labels and the
structure label of the object along with the IPD on the pc-stack. If the IPD of
the instruction is SEN or the same as the top of the pc-stack, then we just join
the label on top of the pc-stack with the context label determined above.
next-pname:
ι = “next-pname dst:r base:r i:n size:n iter:n target:offset”
(v1, v2, ι′) := getNextPropNames(σ, ι, base, i, size, iter, target)
Ln := Γ (vn) unionsq Γ (!ρ) Vn := Υ (vn), n := 1, 2
(Γ (!σ(dst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ (L1 := L1)  (L1 := ?)
(Γ (!σ(i)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ (L2 := L2)  (L2 := ?)
σ′′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ(dst)):=V1
Γ (!σ(dst)):=L1
]
σ′ := σ′′
[
Υ (!σ′′(i)):=V2
Γ (!σ′′(i)):=L2
]
ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
next-pname copies the next name from the property name list created by get-
pnames in iter to dst after deferred NSU check, and jumps to target. If there are
no names left, it continues with the next instruction. Although, it behaves as a
branching instruction, the context pertaining to this opcode is already pushed
in get-pnames. Also, the IPD corresponding to this instruction, is the same as
the one determined by get-pnames. Thus, we do not push on the pc-stack in this
instruction.
resolve:
ι = “resolve dst:r prop:id”
v := resolveInSc(Γ(!ρ), !σ.sc, prop)
L := Γ (v) unionsq Γ (!ρ) V := Υ (v) (Γ (!σ(dst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ (L := L)  (L := ?)
σ′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ(dst)):=V
Γ (!σ(dst)):=L
]
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
resolve searches for the property in the scope chain and writes it into dst register,
if found. The label of the property written in dst is a join of the context label, all
the nodes (structure label of the object contained in it) traversed in the scope
chain and the label associated with the pointers in the chain until the node
(object) where the property is found. If the initial label of the value contained in
dst was lower than the context label, then the label of the value in dst is joined
with ?. In case the property is not found, the instruction throws an exception
(similar to throw, as described later).
resolve-skip:
ι = “resolve-skip dst:r prop:id skip:n”
v := resolveInScWithSkip(Γ(!ρ), !σ.sc, prop, skip)
L := Γ (v) unionsq Γ (!ρ) V := Υ (v) (Γ (!σ(dst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ (L := L)  (L := ?)
σ′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ(dst)):=V
Γ (!σ(dst)):=L
]
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
resolve-skip looks up the property named by prop in the scope chain similar to
resolve, but it skips the top skip levels and writes the result to register dst. If
the property is not found, it also raises an exception and behaves similarly to
resolve.
resolve-global:
ι = “resolve-global dst:r prop:id”
v := resolveGlobal(Γ(!ρ), σ, prop)
L := Γ (v) unionsq Γ (!ρ) V := Υ (v) (Γ (!σ(dst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ (L := L)  (L := ?)
σ′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ(dst)):=V
Γ (!σ(dst)):=L
]
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
resolve-global looks up the property named by prop in the global object. If the
structure of the global object matches the one passed here, it looks into the
global object. Else, it falls back to perform a full resolve.
resolve-base:
ι = “resolve-base dst:r prop:id isStrict:bool”
v := resolveBase(Γ(!ρ), σ, !σ.sc, prop, isStrict)
L := Γ (v) unionsq Γ (!ρ) V := Υ (v) (Γ (!σ(dst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ (L := L)  (L := ?)
σ′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ(dst)):=V
Γ (!σ(dst)):=L
]
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
resolve-base looks up the property named by prop in the scope chain similar to
resolve but writes the object to register dst. If the property is not found and
isStrict is false, the global object is stored in dst.
resolve-with-base:
ι = “resolve-with-base bDst:r pDst:r prop:id”
(bdst, pdst) := resolveBaseAndProperty(Γ(!ρ), σ, baseDst, propDst, prop)
L1 := Γ (!σ(bdst)) unionsq Γ(!ρ) V1 := Υ(!σ(bdst))
L2 := Γ (!σ(pdst)) unionsq Γ(!ρ) V2 := Υ(!σ(pdst))
(Γ (!σ(bDst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ (L1 := L1)  (L1 := ?)
(Γ (!σ(pDst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ (L2 := L2)  (L2 := ?)
σ′′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ(bDst)):=V1
Γ (!σ(bDst)):=L1
]
σ′ := σ′′
[
Υ (!σ′′(pDst)):=V2
Γ (!σ′′(pDst)):=L2
]
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
resolve-with-base looks up the property named by prop in the scope chain similar
to resolve-base and writes the object to register bDst. It also, writes the property
to pDst. If the property is not found it raises an exception like resolve.
get-scoped-var:
ι = “get-scoped-var dst:r index:n skip:n”
v := getScopedVar(Γ(!ρ), σ, θ, index, skip) L := Γ (v) unionsq Γ (!ρ) V := Υ (v)
(Γ (!σ(dst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ (L := L)  (L := ?)
σ′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ(dst)):=V
Γ (!σ(dst)):=L
]
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
get-scoped-var loads the contents of the index local from the scope chain skipping
skip nodes and places it in dst, after deferred NSU. The label of the value in
dst includes the join of the current context along with all the structure label of
objects in the skipped nodes.
put-scoped-var:
ι = “put-scoped-var index:n skip:n value:r”
Γ (!σ(value)) 6= ? σ′ := putScopedVar(Γ(!ρ), σ, θ, index, skip, value)
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
put-scoped-var puts the contents of the value in the index local in the scope
chain skipping skip nodes. The label of the value includes the join of the current
context along with the structure label of all the objects in the skipped nodes.
push-scope:
ι = “push-scope scope:r”
σ′ := pushScope(Γ(!ρ), σ, scope) ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
push-scope converts scope to object and pushes it onto the top of the current
scope chain. The contents of the register scope are replaced by the created object.
The scope chain pointer label is set to the context.
pop-scope:
ι = “pop-scope”
σ′ := popScope(Γ (!ρ), σ) ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
pop-scope removes the top item from the current scope chain if the scope chain
pointer label is greater than or equal to the context.
jmp-scope:
ι = “jmp-scope count:n target:n”
σ′ := jmpScope(Γ(!ρ), σ, count) ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
jmp-scope removes the top count items from the current scope chain if the scope
chain pointer label is greater than or equal to the context. It then jumps to offset
specified by target.
throw:
ι = “throw ex:r” excValue := Υ (!σ(ex))
(σ′, ι′) := throwException(σ, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
throw throws an exception and points to the exception handler as the next
instruction to be executed, if any. The exception handler might be in the same
function or in an earlier function. If it is not present, the program terminates. If
it has an exception handler, it has an edge to the synthetic exit node. Apart from
this, throwException pops the call-frames from the call-stack until it reaches the
call-frame containing the exception handler. It writes the exception value to a
local interpreter variable (excValue), which is then read by catch.
catch:
ι = “catch ex:r”
L := Γ (excValue) unionsq Γ (!ρ) (Γ (!σ(ex)) ≥ Γ (!ρ))⇒ (L := L)  (L := ?)
σ′ := σ
[
Υ (!σ(ex)):=Υ (excValue))
Γ (!σ(ex)):=L
]
excValue := empty
ι′ := Succ(!σ′.CFG, ι) ρ′ := isIPD(ι′, ρ, σ′)
ι, θ, σ, ρ  ι′, θ, σ′, ρ′
catch catches the exception thrown by an instruction whose handler corresponds
to the catch block. It reads the exception value from excValue and writes into
the register ex. If the label of the register is less than the context, a ? is joined
with the label. It then makes the excValue empty and proceeds to execute the
first instruction in the catch block.
8.4 Proofs and Results
The fields in a frame of the pc-stack are denoted by the following symbols: !ρ.ipd
represents the IPD field in the top frame of the pc-stack, Γ (!ρ) returns the label
field in the top frame of the pc-stack, and !ρ.C returns the call-frame field in the
top frame of the pc-stack.
In the definitions and proofs that follow, we assume that the level of attacker
is L in the three-element lattice presented earlier, i.e., in the equivalence rela-
tion ∼β` , ` = L. The level of the attacker is omitted for clarity purposes from
definitions and proofs.
Definition 1 (Partial bijection) A partial bijection β is a binary relation on
heap locations satisfying the following properties: (1) if (a, b) ∈ β and (a, b′) ∈ β,
then b = b′, and (2) if (a, b) ∈ β and (a′, b) ∈ β, then a = a′.
Using partial bijections, we define equivalence of values, labeled values and
objects.
Definition 2 (Value equivalence) Two values r1 and r2 are equivalent up to
β, written r1 ∼β r2 if either (1) r1 = a, r2 = b and (a, b) ∈ β, or (2) r1 = r1 = v
where v is some primitive value.
Definition 3 (Labeled value equivalence) Two labeled values v1 = r`11 and
v2 = r`22 are equivalent up to β, written v1 ∼β v2 if one of the following holds:
(1) `1 = ? or `2 = ?, or (2) `1 = `2 = H, or (3) `1 = `2 = L and r1 ∼β r2.
The first clause of the above definition is standard for the permissive-upgrade
check. It equates a partially leaked value to every other labeled value.
Objects are formally denoted as N = ({pi 7→ {vi,flagsi}}ni=0, __proto__ 7→
a`p , `s) . Here pis correspond to the property name, vis are their respective
values and flagsi represent the writable, enumerable and configurable flags as
described in the PropertyDescriptor structure in the cpp model above. As the
current model does not allow modification of the flags, they are always set to
true. Thus, we do not need to account for the flagsi in the equivalence definition
below. __proto__ represents a labelled pointer to the object’s prototype.
Definition 4 (Object equivalence) For ordinary objects N = ({pi 7→ {vi,
flagsi}}ni=0, __proto__ 7→ a`p , `s) and N ′ = ({p′i 7→ {v′i,flags′i}}mi=0,__proto__
7→ a′`′p , `′s), we say N ∼β N ′ iff either `s = `′s = H or the following hold:
(1) `s = `′s = L, (2) [p0, . . . , pn] = [p′0, . . . , p′m] (in particular, n = m), (3)
∀i. vi ∼β v′i, and (4) a`p ∼β a`
′
p .
For function objects F = (N, f,Σ) and F ′ = (N ′, f ′, Σ′), we say F ∼β F ′ iff
either N.`s = N.`′s = H or N ∼β N ′, f =β f ′ and Σ ∼β Σ′.
The equality f =β f ′ of nodes f, f ′ in CFGs means that the portions of the
CFGs reachable from f, f ′ are equal modulo renaming of operands to bytecodes
under β. Equivalence Σ ∼β Σ′ of scope chains is defined below. Because we
do not allow ? to flow into heaps, we do not need corresponding clauses in the
definition of object equivalence.
Definition 5 (Heap equivalence) For two heaps θ1, θ2, we say that θ1 ∼β θ2
iff ∀(a, b) ∈ β. θ1(a) ∼β θ2(b).
Unlike objects, we allow ? to permeate scope chains, so our definition of
scope chain equivalence must account for it. Scope chains are denoted as Σ. A
scope-chain node contains a label ` along with an object S (either JSActivation
or JSObject) represented as (S, `).
Definition 6 (Scope chain equivalence) For two scope chain nodes S, S′,
we say that S ∼β S′ if one of the following holds: (1) S = O, S′ = O′ and
O ∼β O′, or (2) S = v0 : . . . : vn, S′ = v′0 : . . . : v′n and ∀i. vi ∼β v′i.
Equivalence of two scope chains Σ,Σ′ is defined by the following rules. (1)
nil ∼β nil (2) (nil ∼β (S, `)) if ` = H or ` = ? (3) ((S, `) ∼β nil) if ` = H
or ` = ? and (4) ((S, `) : Σ) ∼β ((S′, `′) : Σ′) if one of the following holds: (a)
` = ? or `′ = ?, (b) ` = `′ = H, or (c) ` = `′ = L, S ∼β S′ and Σ ∼β Σ′.
Definition 7 (Call-frame equivalence) For two call frames µ1, µ2, we say
µ1 ∼β µ2 iff (1) #Registers(µ1) = #Registers(µ2), (2) ∀i. µ1.Registers[i] ∼β
µ2.Registers[i], (3) µ1.CFG =β µ2.CFG, (4) µ1.Scopechain ∼β µ2.Scopechain,
(5) µ1.ιr = µ2.ιr (6) (µ1.`c = µ2.`c = H) ∨ (µ1.`c = µ2.`c = L ∧ µ1.fcallee ∼β
µ2.fcallee) (7) µ1.argcount = µ2.argcount (8) µ1.getter = µ2.getter and (9)
µ1.dReg =β µ1.dReg
Note that a register is simply a labeled value in our semantics, so clause (2)
above is well-defined.
Definition 8 (pc-stack equivalence) For two pc-stacks ρ1, ρ2, we say ρ1 ∼ ρ2
iff the corresponding nodes of ρ1 and ρ2 having label L are equal, except for the
call-frame (C) field.
In proofs that follow, two pc-stack nodes are equal if their respective fields
are equal, except for the call-frame (C) field.
Definition 9 (Call-stack equivalence) Given ρ1 ∼ ρ2, suppose:
1. e1 is the lowest H-labelled node in ρ1
2. e2 is the lowest H-labelled node in ρ2
3. µ1 is the node of σ1 pointed to by e1
4. µ2 is the node of σ2 pointed to by e2
5. σ′1 is prefix of σ1 up to and including µ1 or
if Γ (!ρ1) = L or ρ1 is empty, σ′1 = σ1
6. σ′2 is prefix of σ2 up to and including µ2 or
if Γ (!ρ2) = L or ρ2 is empty, σ′2 = σ2
then σ1 ∼βρ1,ρ2 σ2, iff (1) |σ′1| = |σ′2|, and (2) ∀i ≤ |σ′1|.(σ′1[i] ∼β σ′2[i]).
Definition 10 (State equivalence) Two states s1 = 〈ι1, θ1, σ1, ρ1〉 and s2 =
〈ι2, θ2, σ2, ρ2〉 are equivalent, written as s1 ∼β s2, iff ι1 = ι2, ρ1 ∼ ρ2, θ1 ∼β θ2,
and σ1 ∼βρ1,ρ2 σ2.
Lemma 1 (Confinement Lemma) If 〈ι, θ, σ, ρ〉  〈ι′, θ′, σ′, ρ′〉 and Γ (!ρ) =
H, then ρ ∼ ρ′, σ ∼βρ,ρ′ σ′ and θ ∼β θ′ where β = {(a, a) | a ∈ θ}
Proof. As Γ (!ρ) = H, the L labelled nodes in the pc-stack will remain un-
changed. Branching instructions pushing a new node would have label H due
to monotonicity of pc-stack. Even if ι′ is the IPD corresponding to the !ρ.ipd,
it would only pop the H labelled node. Thus, the L labelled nodes will remain
unchanged. Hence, ρ ∼ ρ′.
We assume that the !ρ is the first node labelled H in the context stack. For,
other higher labelled nodes above the first node labelled H in the pc-stack, the
call-frames corresponding to the nodes having L label in the pc-stack remain the
same. Hence, σ ∼βρ,ρ′ σ′.
By case analysis on the instruction type:
1. prim:
(a) If Γ (!σ(dst)) ≥ Γ (!ρ), then Γ (!σ(dst)) = H.
By premise of prim, Γ (!σ′(dst)) = H. By Definition 3, !σ(dst) ∼β
!σ′(dst).
(b) If Γ (!σ(dst)) < Γ (!ρ), then Γ (!σ′(dst)) will contain a ? and by Defini-
tion 3, !σ(dst) ∼β !σ′(dst).
Only dst changes in the call-frame, so by Definition 7, !σ ∼β !σ′. Also, other
call-frames remain unchanged. By Definition 9, σ ∼βρ,ρ′ σ′.
θ = θ′, thus, θ ∼β θ′.
2. mov: Similar to prim.
3. jfalse: σ = σ′ and θ = θ′, so, σ ∼βρ,ρ′ σ′ and θ ∼β θ′.
4. loop-if-less: Similar to jfalse.
5. typeof : Similar to prim.
6. instanceof : Similar to prim.
7. enter : σ = σ′, so σ ∼βρ,ρ′ σ′. θ = θ′, so θ ∼β θ′.
8. ret: If !σ.getter = false then only !σ is popped, the call-frames until (!ρ.C)
are unchanged. When !σ.getter = true, then it sets !σ′(!σ.dReg) with !σ(res).
Now, let σ1 is the prefix of σ such that !ρ.C =β !σ1. If !σ′ /∈ σ1 then
changes in !σ′ does not effect the callframe equivalence and if !σ′ ∈ σ1 then
Γ (!σ′(!σ.dReg)) = ? (when Γ (!σ1(!σ.dReg))) = L or Γ (!σ1(!σ.dReg))) = ?)
and Γ (!σ′(!σ.dReg))) = H (when Γ (!σ1(!σ.dReg))) = H), each of the cases
give !σ1(!σ.dReg) ∼β !σ′(!σ.dReg) from Definition 3. So, σ ∼βρ,ρ′ σ′, by Defi-
nition 9. θ = θ′, so θ ∼β θ′.
9. end: The confinement lemma does not apply.
10. call: If it pushes on top of pc-stack, !ρ.C is the lowest H-labelled node in
ρ′. If it joins the label with !ρ, the L labelled nodes remain unchanged and
the !ρ.C = !ρ′.C. All the call-frames until !ρ.C remain unchanged. So, by
Definition 9, σ ∼βρ,ρ′ σ′. θ = θ′, so θ ∼β θ′.
11. call-put-result: Similar to prim.
12. call-eval: If it is a user-defined eval, it is similar to call.
In strict mode, it pushes a node on scope-chain with labelH if Γ (!σ′.Σ) = H,
else labels it ?. In non-strict mode, it does not push a node on the scope-chain.
!σ remains equivalent with corresponding call-frame in σ′ by Definition 7.
As other L call-frames are unchanged, by Definition 9, σ ∼βρ,ρ′ σ′.
θ = θ′, so θ ∼β θ′.
13. create-arguments: Over the initial β, by Definition 5, θ ∼β θ′. If the argument
object is created at x, then β = (x, x) ∪ β after the step is taken.
σ ∼βρ,ρ′ σ′ (Similar to prim).
14. new-func: Over the initial β, by Definition 5, θ ∼β θ′. If the function object
is created at x, then β = (x, x) ∪ β after the step is taken.
σ ∼βρ,ρ′ σ′ (Similar to prim).
15. create-activation: Over the initial β, by Definition 5, θ ∼β θ′. If the argument
objects is created at x, then β = (x, x) ∪ β after the step is taken.
It puts the object in dst with label H or ?, depending on dst value’s initial
label. Also, pushes a node containing the object in the scope chain with a ?,
if Γ (!σ.Σ) = L ∨ ? or with label H, if Γ (!σ.Σ) = H or (!σ.Σ) = nil. Thus,
!σ.Σ ∼β !σ′.Σ by Definition 6. By Definition 7, !σ ∼β !σ′. Other call-frames
are unchanged, so σ ∼βρ,ρ′ σ′ by Definition 9.
16. construct: Similar to call.
17. create-this: Similar to create-arguments.
18. new-object: Over the initial β, by Definition 5, θ ∼β θ′. If the new object is
created at x, then β = (x, x) ∪ β after the step is taken.
σ ∼βρ,ρ′ σ′ (Similar to prim).
19. get-by-id: Similar to mov when the property is a data property. If the prop-
erty is an accessor property then getter is invoked and if the invocation of
getter pushes an entry on top of pc-stack, !ρ.C remains the lowest H-labelled
node in ρ′. If it joins the label with !ρ, the L labelled nodes remain unchanged
and the !ρ.C = !ρ′.C. All the call-frames until !ρ.C remain unchanged. So, by
Definition 9, σ ∼βρ,ρ′ σ′. θ = θ′, so θ ∼β θ′.
20. put-by-id: Sets the property of the object base object to the value with label
H if the structure label of the object `s = H. Thus, the object remains low-
equivalent by Definition 4. Thus, θ ∼β θ′ by Definition 5.
Also, σ = σ′, so, σ ∼βρ,ρ′ σ′.
21. del-by-id : Deletes the property if structure label of object, `s = H. Thus,
the object remains low-equivalent by Definition 4. By Definition 5, θ ∼β θ′.
σ ∼βρ,ρ′ σ′ (Similar to mov).
22. getter-setter : Sets accessor property of the object base object with Γ (getter)
and Γ (setter) and label H if the structure label of the object `s = H.
Thus, the object remains low-equivalent by Definition 4. Thus, θ ∼β θ′ by
Definition 5. Also, σ = σ′, so, σ ∼βρ,ρ′ σ′.
23. get-pnames: Similar to mov and jfalse.
24. next-pname: Similar to mov.
25. resolve: If the property exists, it is similar to mov. If it does not, it is similar
to throw.
26. resolve-skip: Similar to resolve.
27. resolve-global: Similar to resolve.
28. resolve-base: Similar to resolve.
29. resolve-with-base: Similar to resolve.
30. get-scoped-var : Similar to mov.
31. put-scoped-var : Writes the value in the indexth register in skipth node. If
Γ (!σ(index)) = H, then, Γ (!σ′(index)) = H. Else if Γ (!σ(index)) = L, then,
Γ (!σ′(index)) = ?. Other call-frames are unchanged. Thus, σ ∼βρ,ρ′ σ′ by
Definition 7 and 9.
θ = θ′, so θ ∼β θ′.
32. push-scope: Pushes node on scope-chain with label H if Γ (!σ.Σ) = H or
(!σ.Σ) = nil. Else, assigns a ? as the label. Thus, !σ.Σ ∼β !σ′.Σ. Regis-
ters remain unchanged. By Definition 7, !σ ∼β !σ′. Other call-frames are
unchanged, so by Definition 9, σ ∼βρ,ρ′ σ′. θ = θ′, so θ ∼β θ′.
33. pop-scope: Pops the node from the scope-chain if Γ (!σ.Σ) = H ∨ ?. Reg-
isters remain unchanged. By Definition 7, !σ ∼β !σ′. Other call-frames are
unchanged, so by Definition 9, σ ∼βρ,ρ′ σ′. θ = θ′, so θ ∼β θ′.
34. jmp-scope: Similar to pop-scope.
35. throw: Pops the call-frames until the handler is reached, i.e., until (!ρ.C).
The property of IPD ensures that !σ′ = (!ρ.C). Either !ρ′.ipd = !ρ.ipd or
ι′ = !ρ.ipd. Thus, !ρ.C is !σ′. This call-frame and the ones below remain
unchanged. Thus, σ ∼βρ,ρ′ σ′ by Definition 9.
θ = θ′, so θ ∼β θ′.
36. catch: Similar to mov.
Corollary 2 If 〈ι0, θ0, σ0, ρ0〉  n 〈ιn, θn, σn, ρn〉 and ∀(0 ≤ i ≤ n).Γ (!ρi) =
H, then ρ0 ∼ ρn, and σ0 ∼βρ0,ρn σn
Proof. To prove: ρ0 ∼ ρn.
Proof by induction on n.
Basis: ρ0 ∼ ρ0
IH : ρ0 ∼ ρn−1
From Definition 8, L labelled nodes of ρ0 and ρn−1 are equal. From Lemma 1,
ρn−1 ∼ ρn so, L labelled nodes of ρn−1 and ρn are equal. Thus, L labelled nodes
of ρ0 and ρn are equal and by Definition 8, ρ0 ∼ ρn.
To prove: σ0 ∼βρ0,ρn σn.
Basis: σ0 ∼βρ0,ρ0 σ0.
IH: σ0 ∼βρ0,ρn−1 σn−1.
From Lemma 1, σn−1 ∼βρn−1,ρn σn. As ∀(0 ≤ i ≤ n).Γ (ρi) = H, the lowest H-
labelled node is the same (pc-stack grows monotonically) in ρ0, ρn−1, ρn. Let the
call-frames pointed to by lowest H-labelled node be C0, Cn−1, Cn with call-stack
size until the call-frames k (from Definition 9 size of the prefix is same and by
transitivity of equality it is the same for all the three cases).
∀µ0 ∈ σ0, µn−1 ∈ σn−1, µn ∈ σn until C0, Cn−1, Cn respectively with sizes k, the
following conditions hold:
1. ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).((µ0[i].#Registers) = (µn−1[i].#Registers)) and ∀(1 ≤ i ≤
k).((µn−1[i].#Registers) = (µn[i].#Registers)).
Thus, ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).((µ0[i].#Registers) = (µn[i].#Registers)).
2. As the number of registers is the same, given by r,
∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).∀r((µ0[i].Registers[r]) ∼β (µn−1[i].Registers[r])) and
∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).∀r.((µn−1[i].Registers[r]) ∼β (µn[i].Registers[r])).
Let v`00 , v
`n−1
n−1 and v`nn represents the values in the registers for σ0, σn−1 and
σn respectively. Then from Definition 3
(a) `0 = `n−1 = H: In this case `n = H and v`00 ∼β v`nn (from Lemma 1 and
Definition 3).
(b) `0 = `n−1 = L and v0 = vn−1: In this case either:
i. `n = ?
ii. `n = L and vn−1 = vn: In this case, the value remains unchanged.
Thus, from Definition 3 v`00 ∼β v`nn .
(c) `0 = ? ∨ `n−1 = ?: Now the following cases arise:
i. `0 = ?: v`00 ∼β v`nn .
ii. `n−1 = ?: By Lemma 1 ln = ?. Thus, v`00 ∼β v`nn .
3. ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).((µ0[i].CFG) = (µn−1[i].CFG)) and ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).((µn−1[i].CFG) =
(µn[i].CFG)).
Thus, ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).((µ0[i].CFG) = (µn[i].CFG)).
4. ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).((µ0[i].Σ) ∼β (µn−1[i].Σ)) and ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).((µn−1[i].Σ) ∼β
(µn[i].Σ)).
From Definition 6:
(a) If nil0 and niln−1 be the two scope chains, then due to confinement
(Lemma 1) µn[i].Σ = nil or µn[i].Σ = (S, `n), where `n = H. In either
case ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).((µ0[i].Σ) ∼β (µn[i].Σ)) from Definition 6.
(b) If ((S0, `0) : Σ0), ((Sn−1, `n−1) : Σn−1) and ((Sn, `n) : Σn) be the three
scope-chains, then for((S0, `0) : Σ0) and ((Sn−1, `n−1) : Σn−1) one of
the following holds:
i. `0 = ? ∨ `n−1 = ?: Due to confinement (Lemma 1) and Definition 6
`n = ?.
ii. `0 = `n−1 = H: Due to confinement (Lemma 1) and Definition 6
ln = H .
iii. `0 = `n−1 = L ∧ S0 ∼β Sn−1 ∧ Σ0 ∼β Σn−1: Due to confinement
(Lemma 1) either one should hold:
A. `n = ?: By Definition 6.
B. `n = L ∧ Sn−1 ∼β Sn ∧Σn−1 ∼β Σn: No additions to the scope
chain.
Thus, ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).((µ0[i].Σ) ∼β (µn[i].Σ)) from Definition 6.
5. ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).((µ0[i].ιr) = (µn−1[i].ιr)) and ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).((µn−1[i].ιr) =
(µn[i].ιr)).
Thus, ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).((µ0[i].ιr) = (µn[i].ιr)).
6. ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).(((µ0[i].`c) = (µn−1[i].`c) = H) ∨ (((µ0[i].`c) = (µn−1[i].`c) =
L) ∧ ((µ0[i].fc) = (µn−1[i].fc)))) and
∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).(((µn−1[i].`c) = (µn[i].`c) = H) ∨ (((µn−1[i].`c) = (µn[i].`c) =
L) ∧ ((µn−1[i].fc) = (µn[i].fc)))).
Then either:
– ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).((µ0[i].`c) = (µn[i].`c) = H) or
– ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).(((µ0[i].`c) = (µn[i].`c) = L) ∧ ((µ0[i].fc) = (µn[i].fc))).
7. ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).((µ0[i].argcount) = (µn−1[i].argcount)) and ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).
((µn−1[i].argcount) = (µn[i].argcount)).
Thus, ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).((µ0[i].argcount) = (µn[i].argcount)).
8. ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).((µ0[i].getter) = (µn−1[i].getter)) and ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).((µn−1[i].getter) =
(µn[i].getter)).
Thus, ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).((µ0[i].getter) = (µn[i].getter)).
9. ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).((µ0[i].dReg) =β (µn−1[i].dReg)) and ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).((µn−1[i].dReg) =β
(µn[i].dReg)).
Thus, ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ k).((µ0[i].dReg) =β (µn[i].dReg)).
From Definition 7 and Definition 9, σ0 ∼βρ0,ρn σn.
Corollary 3 If 〈ι0, θ0, σ0, ρ0〉  ? 〈ιn, θn, σn, ρn〉 and ∀(0 ≤ i ≤ n).Γ (!ρi) =
H, then θ0 ∼β θn
Proof. By induction on n.
Basis: θ0 ∼β θ0 by Definition 5.
IH: θ0 ∼β θn−1.
From IH and Definition 5, ∀(a, b) ∈ β.(θ0(a) ∼β θn−1(b). From Lemma 1,
θn−1 ∼β θn. Thus, ∀(b, c) ∈ β.(θn−1(b) ∼β θn(c)
As (a, b) ∈ β and (b, c) ∈ β, we have (a, c) ∈ β because β is an identity bijection.
Thus, if ∀(a, c) ∈ β.(θ0(a) ∼β θn(c), then θ0 ∼β θn. If θ0(a) and θn−1(b) contain
an ordinary object, then for their respective structure labels `s and `′s, either:
– `s = `′s = H: If `′s = H, then `′′s = H by Definition 4, where `′′s is the
structure label of the object in θn(c). Thus, θ0(a) ∼β θn(c).
– `s = `′s = L: [p0, . . . , pn] = [p′0, . . . , p′m] (n = m), ∀i. vi ∼β v′i, and a`p ∼β a`
′
p
for respective properties in θ0(a) and θn−1(b).
If `′s = L, then `′′s = L and [p′0, . . . , p′m] = [p′′0 , . . . , p′′k ] (m = k), ∀i. v′i ∼β v′′i ,
and a`′p ∼β a`′′p for respective properties in θn−1(b) and θn(c).
`s = `′′s = L, [p0, . . . , pn] = [p′′0 , . . . , p′′k ] (n = k). If ∀i. vi ∼β v′i and ∀i. v′i ∼β
v′′i , then either `i = `′i = `′′i = H or `i = `′i = `′′i = L and ri = r′i = r′′i = n.
Also, as a`p ∼β a`′p and a`′p ∼β a`′′p , we have a`p ∼β a`′′p . Thus, by Definition 4
θ0(a) ∼β θn(c).
If θ0(a) and θn−1(b) contain a function object, then for their respective structure
labels `s and `′s, either:
– `s = `′s = H: If `′s = H, then `′′s = H by Definition 4, where `′′s is the
structure label of the function object in θn(c). Thus, θ0(a) ∼β θn(c).
– `s = `′s = L: `′′s = L is the structure label of the function object in θn(c).
Thus, N ∼β N ′′ from the above result for objects. The CFGs f =β f ′ =β f ′′
and the scope chains Σ ∼β Σ′′ by Corollary 2. Thus, θ0(a) ∼β θn(c).
Thus, θ0 ∼β θn.
Lemma 2 (Supporting Lemma 1) Suppose
〈ι, θ1, σ1, ρ1〉  〈ι′1, θ′1, σ′1, ρ′1〉,
〈ι, θ2, σ2, ρ2〉  〈ι′2, θ′2, σ′2, ρ′2〉,
ρ1 ∼ ρ2, Γ (!ρ1) = Γ (!ρ2) = L, Γ (!ρ′1) = Γ (!ρ′2) and (σ1 ∼βρ1,ρ2 σ2) ∧ (θ1 ∼β θ2)
then ρ′1 ∼ ρ′2, and ∃β′ : ((β′ ⊇ β) ∧ (σ′1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ′2) ∧ (θ′1 ∼β
′
θ′2)).
Proof. Every instruction executes isIPD at the end of the operation. If ι′i is the
IPD corresponding to the !ρi.ipd, then it pops the first node on the pc-stack. As
ρ1 ∼ ρ2 and Γ (!ρ1) = Γ (!ρ2), ι′i would either pop in both the runs or in none.
Thus, ρ′1simρ′2. For instructions that push (branch), we explain in respective
instructions.
Proof by case analysis on the instruction type:
1. prim: No new object is created, so β′ = β.
As σ1 ∼βρ1,ρ2 σ2, so !σ1 ∼β !σ2 and !σ1(srci) ∼β !σ2(srci) for i = 1, 2. Case
analysis on the definition of ∼β for srci.
– If (Γ (!σ1(src1)) = ? ∨ Γ (!σ1(src2)) = ? ∨ Γ (!σ2(src1)) = ? ∨ Γ (!σ2(src2)) =
?), then Γ (!σ1(dst)) = ? ∨ Γ (!σ1(dst)) = ?. Hence, !σ1(dst) ∼β !σ2(dst)
by Definition 3.
– If Γ (!σ1(src1)) = Γ (!σ1(src2)) = H and Γ (!σ2(src1)) = Γ (!σ2(src2)) =
H Γ (!σ1(dst)) = Γ (!σ2(dst)) = H. So, !σ1(dst) ∼β !σ2(dst) by Defini-
tion 3.
– If !σ1(src1) = !σ2(src1) ∧ Γ (!σ1(src2)) = H ∧ Γ (!σ2(src2)) = H, then
Γ (!σ1(dst)) = Γ (!σ2(dst)) = H. So, !σ1(dst) ∼β !σ2(dst) by Definition 3.
Symmetrical reasoning for !σ1(src2) = !σ2(src2) ∧ Γ (!σ1(src1)) = H ∧
Γ (!σ2(src1)) = H.
– !σ1(src1) = !σ2(src1) ∧ !σ1(src2) = !σ2(src2):
!σ1(dst) = !σ2(dst). So, !σ1(dst) ∼β !σ2(dst) by Definition 3.
Only dst changes in the top call-frame of both the call-stacks. Thus, by
Definition 7, !σ′1 ∼β !σ′2. Other call-frames in σ′1 and σ′2 are unchanged. By
Definition 9, σ′1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ′2.
θ1 = θ′1 and θ2 = θ′2, so, θ′1 ∼β
′
θ′2.
2. mov: Similar reasoning as prim with single source.
3. jfalse: No new object is created, so β′ = β.
– !σ1(cond) = !σ2(cond)∧Γ (!σ1(cond)) = Γ (!σ2(cond)) = L: L is the label
to be pushed on ρ.
– Γ (!σ1(cond)) = Γ (!σ2(cond)) = H: H is the label to be pushed on ρ.
The IPD of ι would be the same as we have same CFG in both the cases. If
the IPD is SEN, then we join the label of !ρi with the label obtained above,
which is the same in both the runs. Thus, Γ (!ρ′1) = Γ (!ρ′2). Because ρ1 ∼ ρ2,
ρ′1 ∼ ρ′2.
If the IPD is not SEN, then it is some other node in the same call-frame.
Thus the ipd field is also the same. The H field is false in both the cases.
Thus, the pushed node is the same in both the cases and hence, ρ′1 ∼ ρ′2.
As, Γ (!ρ′1) = Γ (!ρ′′2), either ι′1 = ι′2 = IPD(ι) or ι′1 and ι′2 may or may not
be equal.
σ′1 = σ1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ2 = σ′2. θ′1 = θ1 ∼β
′
θ2 = θ′2.
4. loop-if-less: Similar reasoning as jfalse.
5. type-of: Similar to mov.
6. instance-of: No new object is created, so β′ = β.
The label of the value in the dst is the label of the context joined with
the label of all the prototype chain pointers traversed. As !σ1(value) ∼β
!σ2(value), where `s and `′s are the structure labels of objects pointed to by
!σ1(value) and !σ2(value) respectively, then by Definition 4:
– If `s = `′s = H, then Γ (!σ′1(dst)) = H and Γ (!σ′2(dst)) = H. So,
!σ′1(dst) ∼β !σ′2(dst) from Definition 3.
– If `s = `′s = L, then the objects have similar properties and prototype
chains. If it is not an instance and none of traversed prototype chain and
objects are H, then Γ (!σ′1(dst)) = Γ (!σ′2(dst)) = L and false. Else if it
is present it has true. So, !σ′1(dst) ∼β !σ′2(dst) from Definition 3. If any
one of traversed prototype chain and objects are H, then Γ (!σ′1(dst)) =
Γ (!σ′2(dst)) = H. So, !σ′1(dst) ∼β !σ′2(dst) from Definition 3.
Only dst changes in the top call-frame of both the call-stacks. Thus, by
Definition 7, !σ′1 ∼β !σ′2. Other call-frames are unchanged and by Definition 9,
σ′1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ′2.
θ1 = θ′1 and θ2 = θ′2, so, θ′1 ∼β
′
θ′2.
7. enter: No new object is created, so β′ = β.
σ′1 = σ1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ2 = σ′2. θ′1 = θ1 ∼β
′
θ2 = θ′2.
8. ret: No new object is created, so β′ = β.
Since σ1 ∼β σ2 so only two cases arise for the getter flag.
– !σ1.getter =!σ2.getter = false: σ′1 is same as σ1 with !σ1 popped. Sim-
ilarly, σ′2 is same as σ2 with !σ2 popped. As other call-frames are un-
changed by Definition 9, σ′1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ′2.
– !σ1.getter =!σ2.getter = true: only resgister which changes is the σ′1(!σ1.dReg
and σ′2(!σ2.dReg). Now, if Γ (!σ′1(!σ1.dReg)) = Γ (!σ′2(!σ2.dReg)) = H
then !σ′1(!σ1.dReg) ∼β !σ′2(!σ1.dReg) from defintion 3. And if Γ (!σ′1(!σ1.dReg)) =
Γ (!σ′2(!σ2.dReg)) = L then !σ′1(!σ1.dReg)) =!σ1(res)σ′2(!σ2.dReg) =
!σ2(res) and !σ1(res) ∼β !σ2(res).
θ′1 = θ1 ∼β
′
θ2 = θ′2.
9. end: No σ′i and θ′i.
10. call: No new object is created, so β′ = β.
Pushes the same node on both ρs (similar to jfalse). The only difference is
the H field. As the CFGs are same, if it has an associated exception handler,
we set the H field to true in both the runs. Else, it is false. Thus, !ρ′1 = !ρ′2
is the node pushed on ρ and hence, ρ′1 ∼ ρ′2.
As !σ1(func) ∼β !σ2(func), if:
– (Γ (!ρ′1) = H) : As call-frames until !σ1 and !σ2 remain unchanged, which
correspond to the C field in the lowest H-labelled node and σ1 ∼βρ1,ρ2 σ2,
by Definition 9, σ′1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ′2.
– (Γ (!ρ′1) = L) : Registers created in the new call-frame contain undefined
with label L and, as θ1 ∼β θ2 so the function objects N ∼β N ′ implying
!σ′1.CFG =!σ′2.CFG and !σ′1.Σ ∼β !σ′2.Σ, also return addresses are the
same and the callee is the same. So !σ′1 ∼β !σ′2. Other call-frames are
unchanged so, σ′1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ′2.
θ′1 = θ1 ∼β
′
θ2 = θ′2.
11. call-put-result: Similar to move.
12. call-eval: ρ′1 ∼ ρ′2: Similar to op-call.
In strict mode, it pushes a node on the scope-chain with label L. The pushed
nodes are low-equivalent. Thus, !σ′1.Σ ∼β !σ′2.Σ by Definition 6. In non-strict
mode, it does not push anything and is similar to call. Thus, σ′1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ′2
and θ′1 = θ1 ∼β
′
θ2 = θ′2.
13. create-arguments: Let the argument object be created at x and y in θ1 and
θ2, then β′ = β ∪ (x, y). Γ (σ′1(dst)) = Γ (σ′1(dst)) = L and as !σ1 ∼β !σ2, the
objects are low-equivalent. Thus, !σ′1 ∼β
′ !σ2 by Definition 7 and σ′1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ′2
by Definition 9. Also, θ′1 ∼β
′
θ′2 by Definition 5 as the objects are low-
equivalent.
14. new-func: Let the function object be created at x and y in θ1 and θ2, then
β′ = β ∪ (x, y). Function objects are low-equivalent as !σ1.Σ ∼β !σ2.Σ and
!σ1(func) ∼β !σ2(func). σ′1(dst) ∼β σ′2(dst) by Definition 3. Thus, !σ′1 ∼β
′ !σ2
by Definition 7 and σ′1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ′2 by Definition 9. Also, θ′1 ∼β
′
θ′2 by Definition
5 as the objects are low-equivalent.
15. create-activation: Similar to create-arguments.
16. construct: Similar to call.
17. create-this: Similar to create-this.
18. new-object: Similar to create-arguments.
19. get-by-id: No new object is created, so β′ = β.
As !σ1(base) ∼β !σ2(base), either the objects have the same properties or
are labelled H because of Definition 4. In case of data property, either
Γ (σ′1(dst)) = Γ (σ′2(dst)) = H or Γ (σ′1(dst)) = Γ (σ′2(dst)) = L and value of
prop is the same. So, by Definition 3 !σ′1(dst) ∼β !σ′2(dst).
In case of an accessor property, only dst changes in the top call-frame of
both the call-stacks, and σ′1(dst)) ∼β σ′2(dst)) since σ1 ∼β σ2 and θ1 ∼β θ2
Thus, by Definition 7, !σ′1 ∼β !σ′2. Other call-frames are unchanged and by
Definition 9, σ′1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ′2. For ρ′1 ∼ ρ′2, reasoning is similar to call. θ1 = θ′1
and θ2 = θ′2, so, θ′1 ∼β
′
θ′2.
20. put-by-id: No new object is created, so β′ = β.
σ′1 = σ1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ2 = σ′2.
Because σ1 ∼βρ1,ρ2 σ2, if value is labelled H, then the properties created or
modified will have label H, and structure labels of the respective objects will
become H. Else if value is labelled L, then the properties created or modified
will have same value and label L. Thus, the objects remain low-equivalent
by Definition 4 and hence, by Definition 5, θ′1 ∼β
′
θ′2.
21. del-by-id: No new object is created, so β′ = β.
If the deleted property is H or if the structure label of the object is H , then
(Γ (σ′1(dst)) = Γ (σ′2(dst)) = H). Else if is labelled L, then (Γ (σ′1(dst)) =
Γ (σ′2(dst)) = L) and value is true or false depending on whether the property
is deleted or not. σ′1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ′2 by Definition 3, 7 and 9. If structure labels of
the objects are L, they have same properties by Definition 4. If not, they have
structure label asH. Thus, objects remain low-equivalent by Definition 4 and
θ′1 ∼β
′
θ′2 by Definition 5.
22. put-getter-setter: Reasoning similar to put-by-id.
23. get-pnames: No new object is created, so β′ = β.
As σ1 ∼βρ1,ρ2 σ2, !σ1(base) ∼β !σ2(base) and so are the objects (obj1 and
obj2), obj1 ∼β obj2, as θ1 ∼β θ2. Thus, the structure label of the object is
either H in both the runs or L and have the same properties with values
(Definition 4. The IPD in both the cases is the same and so is the C field.
The mH field is set to false. Thus, ρ′1 ∼ ρ′2.
For σ′1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ′2, it is similar to mov, but done for dst, i and size.
θ′1 = θ1 ∼β
′
θ2 = θ′2.
24. next-pname: Similar to mov, but done for dst and base.
25. resolve: No new object is created, so β′ = β.
If property is found in a L object and the scope-chain node labels are also
L, then the property value is the same as !σ1 ∼β !σ2. If it is in H object or
any scope-chain node labels are H or have a ?, then label of the property
is H or ?. Thus, !σ′1(dst) ∼β !σ′2(dst) by Definition 3. Thus, σ′1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ′2. If
property is not found in both runs, it is similar to throw. If property is not
found in second run, then in the first run the property is in H context. So,
the exception thrown is also H. Until, the call-frame of !ρ′2.ipd, call-frames
are unchanged, so σ′1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ′2. θ′1 = θ1 ∼β
′
θ2 = θ′2.
26. resolve-skip: Similar to resolve.
27. resolve-global: Similar to resolve.
28. resolve-base: Similar to resolve.
29. resolve-with-base: Similar to resolve.
30. get-scoped-var: No new object is created, so β′ = β.
Reads indexth register in object in skipth node in the scope-chain and writes
into dst. As (!σ1.Σ ∼β !σ2.Σ), the value, if labelled L is the same, else is
labelled H or ?. By Definition 3, !σ′1(dst) ∼β !σ′2(dst) and by Definition 7,
!σ′1 ∼β !σ′2. Thus, σ′1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ′2. θ′1 = θ1 ∼β
′
θ2 = θ′2.
31. put-scoped-var: No new object is created, so β′ = β.
Writes into the scope chain node the same value, if “value” is labelled L. If
it is labelled ? in any of the runs, scope chains remain equivalent. If value
is H, it checks the label of register and puts the value with label H or ?.
Thus, (!σ′1.Σ ∼β !σ′2.Σ) by Definition 6 and (!σ′1 ∼β !σ′2) by Definition 7. By
Definition 9, σ′1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ′2. θ′1 = θ1 ∼β
′
θ2 = θ′2.
32. push-scope: No new object is created, so β′ = β.
Pushes in the scope-chain a node containing the object in “scope” with node
label L. As (!σ1(scope) ∼β !σ2(scope)) and (!σ1.Σ ∼β !σ2.Σ), (!σ′1.Σ ∼β
!σ′2.Σ) by Definition 6. Registers and other call-frames remain the same, so,
σ′1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ′2. θ′1 = θ1 ∼β
′
θ2 = θ′2.
33. pop-scope: No new object is created, so β′ = β.
Pops a node from the scope chain if Γ (!σ1.Σ) = Γ (!σ1.Σ) 6= (? ∨ H). As
(!σ1.Σ ∼β !σ2.Σ), so (!σ′1.Σ ∼β !σ′2.Σ). Other registers remain the same, so,
σ′1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ′2. θ′1 = θ1 ∼β
′
θ2 = θ′2.
34. jmp-scope: Similar to pop-scope.
35. throw: No new object is created, so β′ = β.
The property of IPD ensures that !σ′1 = (!ρ1.C) and !σ′2 = (!ρ2.C). The !σ′1
and !σ′2 and the ones below them remain unchanged. Thus, σ′1 ∼β
′
ρ′1,ρ
′
2
σ′2 by
Definition 9.
θ′1 = θ1 ∼β
′
θ2 = θ′2.
36. catch: Similar to mov.
Lemma 3 (Supporting Lemma 2) Suppose
1. 〈ι0, θ′0, σ′0, ρ′0〉  〈ι′1, θ′1, σ′1, ρ′1〉  n−1 〈ι′n, θ′n, σ′n, ρ′n〉,
2. 〈ι0, θ′′0 , σ′′0 , ρ′′0〉  〈ι′′1 , θ′′1 , σ′′1 , ρ′′1〉  m−1 〈ι′′m, θ′′m, σ′′m, ρ′′m〉,
3. (ρ′0 ∼ ρ′′0), (σ′0 ∼βρ′0,ρ′′0 σ
′′
0 ), (θ′0 ∼β θ′′0 ),
4. (Γ (!ρ′0) = Γ (!ρ′′0) = L), (Γ (!ρ′n) = Γ (!ρ′′m) = L),
5. ∀(0 < i < n).(Γ (!ρ′i) = H) ∧ ∀(0 < j < m).(Γ (!ρ′′j ) = H),
then (ι′n = ι′′m), (ρ′n ∼ ρ′′m), (σ′n ∼βρ′n,ρ′′m σ′′m), and (θ′n ∼β θ′′m).
Proof. Starting with the same instruction and high context in both the runs,
we might get two different instructions, ι′1 and ι′′1 . This is only possible if ι was
some branching instruction in the first place and this divergence happened in a
high context. Now,
1. To prove ι′n = ι′′m:
From the property of the IPDs we know that if ι0 pushes a H node on top
of pc-stack which was originally L, IPD(ι0) pops that node. Since we start
from the same instrucion ι0, ι′n = ι′′m = IPD(ι), where Γ (!ρ) = L.
2. To prove ρ′n ∼ ρ′′m:
– n > 1 and m > 1: Γ (!ρ′1) = Γ (!ρ′′1), because ι0 pushes equal nodes and
ι′1, ι
′′
1 are not the IPDs. As ρ′0 ∼ ρ′′0 and Γ (!ρ′1) = Γ (!ρ′′1), from Lemma 2
we get ρ′1 ∼ ρ′′1 and !ρ′1.ipd =!ρ′′1 .ipd = IPD(ι0), if ι′1 6= IPD(ι0) and
ι′′1 6= IPD(ι0). As ι′n = ι′′m = IPD(ι0), it pops the !ρ′1 and !ρ′′1 , which
correspond to ρ′n and ρ′′m in the nth and mth step. (IPD is the point
where we pop the final H node on the pc-stack.) Because ρ′1 ∼ ρ′′1 and
from Corollary 2, ρ′n ∼ ρ′′m.
– n = 1 and m > 1: If Γ (!ρ′1) 6= Γ (!ρ′′1) and ι′1 = IPD(ι0), then Γ (!ρ′1) = L.
It pops the node pushed by ι0, i.e., Γ (!ρ′n) = L. In the other run as
Γ (!ρ′′1) = H and Γ (!ρ′′m) = L, by the property of IPD ι′′m = IPD(ι0),
which would pop from the pc-stack !ρ′′1 , the first frame labelled H on the
pc-stack. Thus, ρ′n ∼ ρ′′m.
– n > 1 and m = 1: Symmetric case of the above.
3. To prove σ′n ∼βρ′n,ρ′′m σ′′m:
(a) n > 1 and m > 1: From Lemma 2 we get σ′1 ∼βρ′1,ρ′′1 σ
′′
1 . From Corollary 2
we get σ′1 ∼βρ′1,ρ′n−1 σ
′
n−1. And from Lemma 1 we have σ′n−1 ∼βρ′
n−1,ρ
′
n
σ′n.
As, ι′n = ι′′m = IPD(ι0), we compare all call-frames of σ′n and σ′′m. As the
IPD of an instruction can lie only in the same call-frame, comparison for
all call-frames in σ′0 and σ′′0 suffice.
σ′0 ∼βρ′0,ρ′′0 σ
′′
0 ⇒ ∀i.((µi ∈ σ′0∧νi ∈ σ′′0 ), (µi ∼β νi)∧∀(r ∈ µi, νi).(µi(r) =
v1 ∧ νi(r) = v2, v1 ∼β v2)).
Let v1 and v2 be represented by vn and vm in σ′n and σ′′m, respectively.
The call-frames in σ′n and σ′′m are represented by µn and νm, respectively.
– We do case analysis on the different cases of Definitions 3 for v1 and
v2, to show vn ∼β vm. As (∀(1 ≤ i < n).(Γ (!ρ′i) = H) ∧ ∀(1 ≤ j <
m).(Γ (!ρ′′j ) = H)):
• If v1 = v2 ∧ Γ (v1) = Γ (v2) = L, then either vn = vm or ((? =
Γ (vn)) ∨ (? = Γ (vm))). By Definition 3(1), vn ∼β vm.
• If Γ (v1) = Γ (v2) = H, then Γ (vn) = Γ (vm) = H. By Defini-
tion 3(2), vn ∼β vm.
• If ? = Γ (v1), then ? = Γ (vn) and if ? = Γ (v2), then ? = Γ (vm).
By Definition 3(1), vn ∼β vm.
– Lets S1 and S2 be the scopechains in σ′0 and σ′′0 . And Sn and Sm
represent the scopechains in σ′n and σ′′m, i.e., Sn and Sm are the
respective scope-chains in the nth and mth step of the two runs
and `n and `m are their node labels. For scope chain pointers the
following cases arise:
i. S1 = S2 = nil: In this case Sn and Sm either remain nil or its
head will have a H label, because of the rules of the instructions
that modify the scope-chain.
ii. S1 = (s1, `1) : Σ1 and S2 = (s2, `2) : Σ2:
A. `1 = ? ∨ `2 = ?: In this case `n and `m will be ? too.
B. `1 = `2 = H: In this case `n and `m will be H too.
C. `1 = `2 = L ∧ Σ1 ∼β Σ2: In this case `n = ? and `m = ? or
scopechains remain unchanged.
(b) n = 1 and m > 1:
In case of jfalse and loop-if-less, σ′0 = σ′1 and σ′′0 = σ′′1 . And in case
of get-pnames, if n = 1 and m 6= 1, Υ (!σ′0(base)) = undefined and
Υ (!σ′′0 (base)) 6= undefined. Because σ′0 ∼β σ′′0 , !σ′0(base) ∼β !σ′′0 (base).
Hence, Γ (!σ′0(base)) = Γ (!σ′′0 (base)) = H. Thus, Γ (!σ′1(dst)) = Γ (!σ′1(i)) =
Γ (!σ′1(size)) = H and similarly, Γ (!σ′′1 (dst)) = Γ (!σ′′1 (i)) = Γ (!σ′′1 (size)) =
H. Other registers remain unchanged and so do the other call-frames.
Thus, σ′1 ∼βρ′1,ρ′′1 σ
′′
1 . From the case (a) above, we know that if σ′1 ∼βρ′1,ρ′′1
σ′′1 , then σ′n ∼βρ′n,ρ′′m σ′′m.
(c) n > 1 and m = 1: Symmetric case of the above.
4. To prove θ′n ∼β θ′′m:
(a) n > 1 and m > 1: From Lemma 2 we get θ′1 ∼β θ′′1 . From Corollary 3 we
get θ′1 ∼β θ′n−1. And from Lemma 1 we have θ′n−1 ∼β θ′n. Assume O1 is
an object at x in θ′1 and O2 is an object at y in θ′′1 , such that (x, y) ∈ β
and On and Om are the respective objects in the nth and mth step of
the two runs. We do case analysis on the different cases of Definitions 4
for O1 and O2, to show On ∼β Om.
– If Γ (O1) = Γ (O2) = H, then Γ (On) = Γ (Om) = H. By Definition 4,
On ∼β Om.
– If O1 = O2 ∧ Γ (O1) = Γ (O2) = L, then On = Om ∧ Γ (On) =
Γ (Om) = L. By Definition 4, On ∼β Om.
Similarly, for function objects, the structure labels would remain H if
they were originally H or will remain L with the same CFGs and scope-
chains.
(b) n = 1 and m > 1: In case of jfalse, loop-if-less, get-pnames, θ′0 = θ′1
and θ′′0 = θ′′1 . Thus, θ′1 ∼β θ′′1 . From the case (a) above, we know that if
θ′1 ∼β θ′′1 , then θ′n ∼β θ′′m.
(c) n > 1 and m = 1: Symmetric case of the above.
Definition 11 (Trace) A trace is defined as a sequence of configurations or
states resulting from a program evaluation, i.e., for a program evaluation P =
s1  s2  . . .  sn where si = 〈ιi, θi, σi, ρi〉, the corresponding trace is given
as T (P) := s1 :: s2 :: . . . :: sn.
Definition 12 (Epoch-trace) An epoch-trace (E) over a trace T = s1 :: s2 ::
. . . :: sn where si = 〈ιi, θi, σi, ρi〉 is defined inductively as:
E(nil) := nil
E(si :: T ) :=
{
si :: E(T ) if Γ (!ρi) = L,
E(T ) else if Γ (!ρi) = H.
Theorem 1 (Termination-Insensitive Non-interference).
Suppose P and P ′ are two program evaluations.
Then for their respective epoch-traces given by:
E(T (P)) = s1 :: s2 :: . . . :: sn,
E(T (P ′)) = s′1 :: s′2 :: . . . :: s′m,
if s1 ∼β s′1 and n ≤ m,
then
∃βn ⊇ β : sn ∼βn s′n
Proof. Proof proceeds by induction on n.
Basis: s1 ∼β s′1, by assumption.
IH: sk ∼βk s′k where βk ⊇ β.
To prove: ∃βk+1 ⊇ β : sk+1 ∼βk+1 s′k+1.
Let sk  i sk+1 and sk  i′ s′k+1, then:
– i = i′ = 1: From Lemma 2, sk+1 ∼βk+1 s′k+1 where βk+1 ⊇ β.
– i > 1 or i′ > 1: From Lemma 3, sk+1 ∼βk+1 s′k+1 where βk+1 = β.
Corollary 4 Suppose:
1. 〈ι1, θ1, σ1, ρ1〉 ∼β 〈ι2, θ2, σ2, ρ2〉
2. 〈ι1, θ1, σ1, ρ1〉 ∗ 〈end, θ′1, [], []〉
3. 〈ι2, θ2, σ2, ρ2〉 ∗ 〈end, θ′2, [], []〉
Then, ∃β′ ⊇ β such that θ′1 ∼β
′
θ′2.
Proof. σ1, σ2 and ρ1, ρ2 are empty at the end of ∗ steps. From the semantics,
we know that in L context both runs would push and pop the same number of
nodes. Thus, both take same number of steps in L context. Let k be the number
of states in L context. Then in Theorem 1, n = m = k. Thus, sk ∼βk s′k, where
sk = 〈end, θ′1, [], []〉 and s′k = 〈end, θ′2, [], []〉. By Definition 10, θ′1 ∼β
′
θ′2, where
β′ = βk.
